CHAPTER FOURTY-ONE Part 4 of 4

A HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF "TRANSFER" IN ZIONISM

by Israel Shahak

Since early summer 1987, a movement has been growing in Israeli-Jewish society which supports the idea of expelling all Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to neighboring Arab countries or, preferably, beyond. The present plans resemble older Zionist attempts or plans for the expulsion of Palestinians, referred to euphemistically as "transfer" plans. It must be emphasized that the existence of a very strong minority that advocates this idea, combined with the support or at very least the lack of opposition from influential personalities, makes this idea of "transfer" a potentially very dangerous one. Indeed, a significant minority of Israeli Jews takes this option seriously.

In general, opposition inside Israel to transfer includes people from across the political spectrum, but it is much stronger among the secular than among the religious. Numerous warnings about the possibility of transfer have been published in Israel. For example, Israel Eilat, a former LEHI (Stem Gang) member, published an article in Hadashot on 8 March 1988 entitled "Better a Civil War," in which, after describing how some of his former comrades support the idea of transfer and comparing it to the transfer of Jews during the Second World War, Eilat stated his intention to fight a civil war in Israel if that were what was needed to stop such an attempt.

Just as significant is that many of those who oppose "transfer" do so on purely pragmatic grounds, avoiding judging the ideas as wrong, but simply terming it impractical or difficult. They include such important people as General (res.) Shlomo Gait, a former chief of military intelligence, who concluded that "there is no chance of carrying it out" (Ha'Aretz, 2 March 1988). In the same way Haifa University professor Amnon Sofer, a man with high connections in the Israeli establishment, argued against "transfer" in the following terms:

How much money is it going to cost? How many trucks will be needed? Where will the fenced deportation camps be established on the way to deportation? ... And, the main thing: how many can we deport before the great powers intervene in the events here? Even the proponents of the transfer understand that the idea is impracticable. (Koterit Rashit, 3 February 1988)

The Concept of "Transfer" in Zionism

Although isolated, early expressionsof support for the idea of "transfer" among Zionists were made in 1937, at a time when the Zionist movement in Palestine was gaining strength. The Palestinian revolt was about a year old and had led the British, through the Peel Commission, to propose the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state. At the same time, the Jewish population of Palestine had increased markedly in the previous few years as a result of Hitler's rise to power in Germany and the subsequent emigration of many European Jews to Palestine as anti-Semitism spread across the continent. For example, in 1932, just before Hitler took power, the number of Jews in Palestine was only about 180,000, compared with the estimate of 90,000 in 1914. However, in 1933,30,000 Jews immigrated to Palestine; in 1934,42,000; in 1935, about 62,000; and in 1936,30,000. (Of these numbers, German Jews accounted respectively for 7,600, 9,800; 8,600, and 8,700.) However, those numbers represent only legal immigration, that was approved by the British authorities. There was also illegal immigration of significant size. As a result, in four years, the number of Jews in Palestine almost doubled, thus creating a community that could for the first time have confidence in its own strength.

It was under these conditions that the highest body of Mapai, the party that was most influential among the Jewish population in Palestine, convened a congress of its supporters from Palestine and other countries from 29 July to 7 August 1937 in Zurich. It was then that the "transfer" became policy, planned and supported by most of the highest-ranking leaders and opposed on moral grounds by none. The proceedings of this congress were subsequently edited by David Ben-Gurion and published in Tel Aviv in 1938.(54) The Zionist leaders were emboldened by the fact that the first official mention of "transfer" came from the Peel Commission, although its plan, which included the "transfer" of the Palestinian population from the area apportioned to the proposed Jewish state, was never officially approved by the British government.

As Ben-Gurion commented:

The Commission does not suggest dispossessing the Arabs; it advocates their transfer and settlement in the Arab states. It seems to me unnecessary to explain the fundamental and deep difference between expulsion and transfer. Until now, we also, have achieved our settlements by way of transfer of population from place to place ... only in a few places of our colonization were we not forced to transfer the earlier residents. (55)

What Ben-Gurion only hinted at, other leaders elaborated upon. Eliezer Kaplan, who later became the first Israeli minister of finance, said at the time:

I shall not enter presently into all the details of the question of the 'transfer' of the Arabs. But it is not fairto compare this proposal to the expulsion of the Jews from Germany or any other country. The matter here is not one of expulsion, but of organized transfer of a few Arabs from a given territory to an Arab state, i.e. to the vicinity of their own people.

Another of the leaders of the party, a member of Kibbutz Ramat HaKovesh had this to say: "As for the forced transfer, as a member of Kibbutz Ramat HaKovesh, I would be very glad if it would be possible to be freed from the pleasant neighborliness of the Palestinian people of Miski, Tirah, and Qalqiliyyah." However, he wondered: "Is there any hope that the Arabs will agree to this of their own free will?"

Another important leader of the time, Shlomo Lavie, had the following vision of justice: "The demand that the Arabs move and clear the place for us, since they have enough places to go ... this demand in itself is perfectly just and moral. But in this situation we are not capable of raising it before the political world as a serious claim, and against our own will we must agree with the British ..." Yet another important leftist, who in 1948 became a leader of Mapam and an Israeli minister, A. Cizling, had the following view of morality and of the future:

I do not contest our moral right to advocate an exchange of population. There is no moral flaw in the proposal, the aim of which is to allow the concentration of national life. On the contrary, ... it probably will happen in another world order ... but the probability would be greater and the proposal itself more sensible if it consisted of an actual exchange of population between a united Jewish land of Israel, some time in the future, and Iraq and other distant Arab countries, including the transfer of their Jews to the Land of Israel.

One should not construe from the above quotes that there were no objections to the idea of "transfer" in that congress. An example of the typical opposition is the statement of one of the influential ideologues, Avraham Tratakover:

Was sufficient attention paid to the question of the transfer from the point of view of future Jewish settlement in the other countries of the Middle East? Isn't there a danger that if we establish the principle of a national state free of national minorities, that then they may use the same principle against us.. . Is this not too heavy a price to pay in order to get rid of a few dozen thousands of Arabs in the Hebrew state, since they probably will not allow us to get rid of more than this number?"

It is worth quoting from two other speakers who attended the congress. The first, Berl Katznelson, was often called "the conscience of Labor Zionism":

The question of the transfer of population has given rise to discussion among us: is it allowed or forbidden? My conscience is clear on this point absolutely. A remote neighbor is better than a close enemy. They will not lose from being transferred and we shall certainly not lose from it ... I have long been of the opinion that this is the best of all solutions, and in the days of gloom I was reinforced in my awareness that it must come someday. But I never imagined that the transfer would be merely to the neighborhood of Nablus. I always believed that they were destined to be transferred to Syria and Iraq.

Finally, Golda Meir stated: "I would agree that if the Arabs leave the country my conscience would be absolutely clear. But is there such a possibility?"

The next and most important stage in the planning of the "transfer" occurred a few years later. The evidence is to be found in Yosef Weitz's My Diary andLetters to the Children. Weitz was an employee of the World Zionist Organization and in 1932 reached the position of director of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) in Palestine. The JNF was and is engaged in purchasing non-Jewish land in Palestine and turning it into an exclusively Jewish domain. Weitz was also a prominent and long-standing member of Mapai. In both capacities he was in intimate and official contract with all the Zionist leaders of the time.

In the diary, Weitz describes how he went to the office of a junior colleague in the JNF, Lifschitz, who was still interested in the task of acquiring Palestinian real estate and who had prepared a very detailed map of Palestine in order to help him with this task. Weitz told him that things were going to change after the war, meaning the Second World War, which was then raging:

Among ourselves it must be clear that there is no room for both peoples in this small country. If the Arabs leave the country, it will be wide open for us. And if the Arabs stay, the country will remain narrow and miserable. When the war is over, and the English have won and when the judges sit on the throne of law, our people must bring their petitions and their claims before them; the only solution is the Land of Israel, or at least the Western Land of Israel [i.e. Palestine] without Arabs. There is no room for compromise on this point! The Zionist enterprise so far, in terms of preparing the ground and paving the way for the creation of the Hebrew state in the Land of Israel, has been fine and good in its own time, and could do without "land buying," but this will not bring about the State of Israel. That must come all at once, in the manner of the Redemption, and there is no way besides transferring the Arabs from here to the neighboringcountries, to transfer them all. Except perhaps for Bethlehem, Nazareth, and Old Jerusalem we must not leave a single village, not a single tribe. And the transfer must be directed to Iraq, to Syria, andeven toTransjordan. For that purpose we will find money, a lot a money. And only with such a transfer will the country be able to absorb millions of our brothers, and the Jewish question will be solved once and for all. There is no other way out. (22 June 1941)

Lifschitz agreed at once and soon Weitz was able to obtain the agreement of many other Zionist leaders for the "transfer" and for the accompanying idea "that the Land of Israel is not small at all, if only the Arabs would get out of it, and if its borders would be enlarged a bit, to the north all the way to the Litani, and in the east all the way to the Golan Heights ... the Arabs must be transferred to Iraq and to northern Syria." The first leader Weitz engaged was Ussishkin, already quite old at the time, whose support was not difficult to get since his enmity toward the Arabs was notorious (23 June 1941). But on 10 July 194 1 Weitz recorded ameeting with Moshe Sharett (then known as Shertok) and Kaplan. Sharett was chief of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency (the executive organ of the World Zionist Organization), in effect its foreign minister, while Kaplan was its treasurer. Both approved of the idea and of beginning at once a practical search for places to which the Palestinians could be "transferred." On 28 August 1941 Weitz had a meeting with Katznelson and after hearing from him how he had supported the "transfer" for yearsÑWi not for the whole of the Land of Israel, then at least for a part of itM-he obtained his promise to speak to Sharett and Kaplan in support of Weitz' ideas.

Weitz was accordingly officially delegated to go to Syria. The German invasion of the USSR and the extermination of Jews in its conquered eastern areas were already well advanced when Weitz recorded (1 September 1941) that he had received the French visa to go to Syria and Lebanon. The purpose of the trip was to check the concrete side of the population "transfer" plan. On 6 September 1941, on his way to Syria, he stopped at Kibbutz Mishmar Ha'Emek, then as now the center of the HaShomer HaTza'ir movement, the main component of Mapam. Both prided themselves on their "good relations" with the Arabs. In spite, or perhaps because of this, Weitz had no fear of talking with the kibbutz members about the coming "transfer." He was answered by one of the two leaders of the party at the time, Ya'akov Hazan, that he and his kibbutz movement would oppose the plan because it was useless and because "it could not be implemented." Other kibbutz members bombarded him with questions, but in essence said that they did not believe in the feasibility of the plan, even though they liked the idea.

After arriving in Damascus, on 11 September Weitz, assisted by the Arab agent of the JNF in the city, set out in search of maps. Weitz' interest focused on northern Syria, especially the Jazirah region, beyond the Euphrates. On 18 September he arrived in the region and recorded that "this Jazirah will become a huge absorbing home" for the Palestinians to be expelled, since "there is much good land, a lot of water ready to be used and exploited." However, he also felt the Iraqi part of the Jazirah would be needed, as he also explicitly recorded. A further idea that occurred to him was that the formation of a separate state in eastern Syria, based on the supposed wishes of the Syrian bedouin, should also be promoted.

On 4 October 1941 he was back in Jerusalem and reported to Kaplan about his trip. He proposed the establishment of a "permanent council" to prepare for the "transfer." Kaplan responded favorably and suggested a list of possi ble members of the council, including Berl Kat~nelson. On 3 1 May 1942, he records a talk with Elazar Granot, one of the highest officials of the Jewish Agency at the time, about the population "transfer" plan. Granot notified him that a committee composed of himself, Kaplan, Sharett, and Katznelson was set "to study and prepare a plan for the activities." Granot, although expressing "full sympathy" for the "transfer" warned him that the plan "must be implemented very cautiously ... we decided that he would prepare an outline and being it to a meeting which we would hold in another two days."

Immediately after the establishment of the State of Israel, Weitz recorded (28 May 1948) his nomination along with two "Arabists," Ezra Danin and Eliyahu Sasson, to a committee of three, the purpose of which as recorded by Weitz was to discuss if they should "do something so as to transform the exodus of the Arabs from the country into a fact, so that they return no more?" Moreover, many of the activities of this committee, but especially of Weitz, were related to the actual destruction of Palestinian villages, as Weitz himself recorded, As a result, there can be little doubt that between 1942 and 1947-48 the Zionist movement was preparing for the expulsion of the Palestinians that in fact took place during the 1947-49 war.

Transfer after the Establishment of the State

By 1951, Israel had signed cease-fire agreements with the neighboring Arab states and had a Palestinian population that represented only a fraction of its pre-1947 numbers. In autumn of that year, Weitz met with Moshe Sharett (28 August 195 I), the Israeli minister of foreign affairs, to discuss the "project of transferring or of contributing to the emigration of the Christian Arabs of the upper Galilee to South America." Two supporters of that particular policy, as Weitz notes, were Yitzhaq Navon and Ya'akov Tsur (both currently of the Labor party). Sharett was to bring this idea of "transferring" Christian Arabs before the prime minister, Ben- Gurion. On 31 August Sharett's secretary notified Weitz that Ben-Gurion had given his agreement and authorized the project. However, on 13 November 195 1 Weitz recorded that that very day he had had an interview with the prime minister in order to obtain his special blessing before going to Argentina, the place to which the Christian Palestinians were to be "transferred." When reminded of the idea, the prime minister remarked "that it was a splendid idea, and very important." On 30 November, Weitz was in Buenos Aires where, in the Israeli legation, he consulted with three Jewish agronomists who had been in Argentina for a long time to draw up a schedule for his tour of a few provinces in connection with the "transfer" plan.

After completing his Argentine tour, on 5 February 1952 Weitz was back in Jerusalem to discuss the matter with Ben-Gurion. The prime minister's primary concern was that the Christian Church would surely oppose the project, but that, nonetheless, "We must do it." And the process began at once. On 6 March, Weitz, together with another official of the JNF, was in Jish, a Christian village in the Upper Galilee, trying to "persuade" its inhabitants to emigrate to Argentina. The first meeting was unsuccessful, but Weitz returned for a second meeting, the results of which he recorded on 8 March. Weitz relates how he tried again to describe Argentina as the best of all lands, but his listeners sat in silence until the end, 1 when one Palestinian remarked, "No country is as good as this country of ours. Even our mountains are better than the plains over there. Even the rock can grow plants, and every stone produces a crop."

The plan of "transfer" of the Christian Palestinians to Argentina had apparently failed, as witnessed by the subsequent silence on the matter by Weitz. However, from other information, (57) it is known that it was pursued for some months, using the means described above as well as through offers of considerable bribes, but again without success. The authorities were unwilling to employ extreme forms of pressure against Israeli citizens, and therefore, the plan was allowed to die.

However, this did not represent the end of the "transfer" plans in this period. If one passes over the less important plans, which are reported in other sources, such as Ezra Danin's autobiography, and focuses only on those attempts in which Weitz was involved-which appear to be the most important~one finds that the next such plan is mentioned in Weitz' diary on 24 July 1955. Weitz records a meeting held in the office of Prime Minister Moshe Sharett to discuss a report from Paris about a possible way to "solve" the problem of the Arab refugees. The participants included Weitz, Sharett, Levy Eshkol (then minister of finance), Teddy Kollek (now mayor of Jerusalem), and several of Israel's most important diplomats and Arabists. In a subsequent meeting, held on 6 November 1955, Sharett reported that U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles had promised financial support for the plan. The plan's main element-which became clearer in later, informal meetings of this high-level committee-was to settle the Palestinian refugees in Libya, which at the time had a monarchic regime with strong, but secret relations with Israel. By 27 February 1956 Ben-Gurion had joined the meetings of the group, and since Eshkol insisted that he had no money to cover even the initial costs of the projects (estimated at one million pounds sterling), it was decided to approach the Americans for assistance.

After several meetings, on 3 June 1956 the committee was given official status. On the say day, Ya'akov Palmon, one of the top Israeli Arabists and a member of the group from its inception, sent a telegram from Geneva about the progress of the Libya plan. On 17 June he was back in Israel and at a meeting of the committee reported on his conversations with Arabs in London about Libya:

It is possible to obtain permission from the prime minister for four or five Palestinian families which settled in Libya and occupy government posts to invite their relatives to settle there. In this way there will develop in Libya an Arab settlement, an ex-Palestinian one from among the landlords in Israel, and this will open a way to develop settlements of Palestinians in Libya.

Accordingly, an unnamed Israeli agent was ordered to Libya to continue the talks. Meanwhile, Weitz had an idea of expelling a few Israeli Palestinians from an area on the northern border to Lebanon (2 July 1956), but did not pursue it because there were no Jewish settlers to take their places.

The Libya idea gained prominence again, however, with the dismissal of Sharett as minister of foreign affairs and his replacement by Golda Meir. On 10 July 1956 she was briefed by Weitz about the Libya plan and on 15 July a report was received from Palmon in Rome that he had met with the Libyan representative and that he was "satisfied with him." On 18 June he was back in Israel and reported that "there are large possibilities, not expensive" to settle Palestinians in Libya. After a few meetings of the committee, a concluding session was held on 3 September 1956. "We insisted particularly on the Libya operation. We spelled out the details. She will present the reports to the prime minister Ben-Gurion and then she will give an answer." Each of the officials was assigned a particular duty. Palmon, for example, was to be stationed permanently in Rome for this purpose and a small committee was established, composed of Weitz and representatives of the ministries of foreign affairs and finance. On 4 October, however, when Ben-Gurion called for a meeting to discuss the plan, Weitz was told that the money would not be allocated because of limited means. "For that purpose, we need money, and now we have none. Weapons consume everything." After a few additional sessions the committee was disbanded in the wake of the Suez War.

From information published later in bits and pieces we know that the committee did succeed in "transferring" a few hundred Israeli Palestinians to Libya. Some mention a number of 500; others' figures are a bit higher or lower. Those who did leave were from poor Muslim clans whose leaders were bribed to order them to go, while they, the leaders, remained at home. However, those who immigrated to Libya did so on the condition that they be allowed to keep their Israeli passports. Many years later, after Qadhdhafi came to power, some of them left for Europe and from there invoked their "right to return." They were allowed to do so, partly in order to prevent a scandal and partly out of regard for formalities, especially as they affect Israeli citizens.

Research has not turned up any evidence to suggest that the "transfer" plans were pursued in any form in the period from 1957 until the 1967 war. However, the Israeli victory in that war and the resultant outburst of messianism in Israeli- Jewish society led to a revival of the "transfer" idea. Weitz, by then retired, was inspired to act again. On 29 September 1967 he published an article in Davar in which he quoted his 1940 proposal to expel all the Palestinians, and asked the public to push for it in the wake of the victory. But to his chagrin, he was not taken seriously, gained access to only a few meetings on the subject (with difficulty at that), and was excluded from participating in the Israeli activities regarding "transfer" that were taking place.

One may distinguish among three different kinds of "transfers" carried out by Israel with great success after its June 1967 victory. The first was the expulsion of large numbers of Palestinians during the course of the hostilities and during a short period thereafter. There followed a longer period of less intensive "inducement to leave," which lasted a few more weeks in the West Bank and until August 1968 in the Gaza Strip. During this period Palestinians were either frightened by indirect means: a few days of shooting in the air in a particular village followed by a polite offer to transport them in buses well-provided with water and even food for babies as far as the Jordan River bridges. Some Palestinians were ordered to leave by their own collaborating mukhtars who received a modest 20 Israeli pounds paid by the Israelis in charge of the "transfer." This form of expulsion did not end until August 1968, when the Jordanian authorities introduced very strict limitations on the passage of large groups of Palestinians across the Jordan River bridges. The last two or three groups of the "transferred" Palestinians were left waiting on the banks of the river for a considerable time to pressure the Jordanian authorities, only eventually to be returned to the Gaza Strip.

The third method of transfer" is now well-documented on the Israeli side, a notable example being an article by two Israeli journalists, Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, both of whom have written on Israeli intelligence affairs. On 21 February 1988 the two published an article in English entitled "A final Solution of the Palestinian Problem?," similar to an article they published in Davar on 19 February 1988 under the title "This Is the History of Transfer."

The story Raviv and Melman tell begins two weeks after the Israeli victory in the 1967 war. At the time, Abba Eban, the Israeli foreign minister, called for resettling the refugees in neighboring Arab countries, mainly Syria and Iraq. Yigal Allon, the deputy prime minister, proposed that the Palestinian refugees be transported to the Sinai Desert or that they be persuaded to move abroad. According to notes taken at a cabinet meeting by Ya'akov Herzog (brother of the current president and then the director-general of the prime minister's office), Allon complained that not enough was being done among the Arabs to encourage emigration. Menahem Begin, minister-without-portfolio but without any significant influence, recommended that the refugee camps be demolished and that their residents be transferred to Sinai, which had been captured from the Egyptians.

The product of these discussions, as was the case eleven years earlier, was the formation of a secret unit charged with "encouraging" the departure of Palestinians. This "secret unit" was composed of representatives of the prime minister's office, the Ministry of Defense, and the army. The unit had a center in Gaza on one of the main streets (al-Mukhtar St.) and after furnishing the Palestinians with one-way tickets to various South American countries (mainly Paraguay) through a Tel Aviv travel agency, it promised to provide further financial help to help them get established once they had arrived, a promise that was not kept. The plan continued for about three years and ended only because of an unexpected development. The desperation of those Palestinians who were promised financial assistance but received none led one of them, Tala1 Ibn Dimassi, on 4 May 1970 to go to the Israeli embassy and demand to see the ambassador. When his request was denied he shot the ambassador dead. Although the Israeli authorities were quick to blame the PLO, the Paraguayan authorities soon discovered the truth and stopped the "transfer." It may well be that the original "transfer" had not been approved by the highest levels of the Paraguayan regime (as apparently was the case with the Argentine and Libyan ventures as well), but rather, was fueled by the usual methods of bribery and influence peddling, which led to its collapse once it was discovered. According to the Melman and Raviv article in Davar a total of about 1,000 Palestinians were "transferred" in this way.

There is no reason to suppose that the "transfer" attempts instigated by the Israeli government, which were considered an integral part of its plan for "solving the Palestinian problem," ever ceased. They emerged again in the wake of the alleged Israeli victory during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, when then Minister-Without Portfolio Ya'akov Meridor, on being asked what to do with the Palestinians, made the following statement on a visit to inspect the Sidon area: "You must drive them east, toward Syria ... and let them not return."(59) Melman and Raviv's Hebrew article concludes with the following paragraph, which is absent from the English version:

The last riots in the territories are causing a polarization in Israeli public opinion: On the one side there are more and more people who understand that there is no escape but to find a political solution which will free Israel from the great majority of the territories, and on the other, the opinion of those who believe that the weapon of expulsion is the most efficient of those that remain in Israeli hands, after the live bullet, the club, and hard blows prove to be insufficient. It is too early to predict what will happen between those two poles.

Conclusions

What is most significant in the Zionist "transfer" plans is not the extent of the suffering caused the Palestinians as a result. After all, much greater loss of life occurred during the partition of the Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan than took place during the 1947-49 Palestine war. But the significant point about these events is their spontaneity. No one has ever suggested that the Indian leaders, of whatever religion, planned many years earlier a "transfer" of people of the other religion or nationality, whatever their other aims. It is the Zionist preparation and planning of the "transfer" and their persistence in the pursuit of this idea that are more important for understanding and for preventing similar events in the future that are ritual recitations of events of the past. It is for that reason that this article has avoided any discussion of Dayr Yasin, for example. Accurate and detailed knowledge of Zionist thought as expressed by its leaders led to many incidents like Dayr Yasin and, more importantly, can yet again lead to similar or worse events.

The persistence with which mainstream Zionism, and in particular "socialist Zionism" has pursued the idea of "transfer" is highly significant. Let us return briefly to the circumstances surrounding the Argentine "transfer" plan: in 195 1-52, Israel was in serious economic difficulty. In addition to a general lack of money, the Jewish population of Israel, with its many new immigrants, suffered from a lack of food, especially fresh vegetables, which the residents of Jish and other Christin Palestinian villages intended for "transfer" produced in abundance, and which Jewish agriculture in Israel at this time did not. Nevertheless, one finds the most important leaders of Israel devoting an enormous amount of time, thought, effort, and money to a plan for the immediate "transfer" of a peaceful, loyal, and food-producing population. Even the principle of divide and rule, so often employed to divide Christian and Muslim Palestinians was sacrificed by the most important leaders of mainstream Zionism without any apparent hesitation for a principle much more important for them: the removal of as many Palestinians as possible at any given time. This is not imperialism, either in theory or in its usual practice. Nor is it the usual behavior of settler states or regimes. Can one imagine South Africa trying to deport the people of Transkei during a period of apparent loyalty and quiet? This and the other examples summarized in this essay demonstrate the essential falsity of any analysis of Zionism that tries to reduce it to the settler state, colonial, or imperial models.

At the same time, the examples have demonstrated the presence of a considerable degree of pragmatism in the Zionists' pursuit of "transfer." We have seen Ben-Gurion apprehensive about the possible opposition of the Christian Church, even while approving the Argentine "transfer." Likewise there is the example of the members of Kibbutz Mishmar Ha'Emek (on 5 September 194 1) who liked the idea of the total "transfer" of the population, but who did not believe in the feasibility of the plan. In fact, the development of official and then public support for "transfer" in mainstream Zionism exhibits the same dual aspect. The real difference between the mainstream and those who may be called extremists, it seems, is simply the addition of pragmatism- the knowledge of how politics operate-and not the ultimate aim of a Palestine completely without Palestinians or completely Jewish.

Once one understands this, it becomes clear why the great periods of planning activity for the "transfer," particularly in its more extreme forms, are limited to the periods in which mainstream Zionism has been, or considered itself to be, strong. The extremists or non-pragmatists consider that Zionism is always strong. The times in which no transfer attempts, or at least no significant ones, are made are those during or after Zionist or Israeli defeats. However, the concept of Zionist or Israeli strength should be dissociated from the reality of the situation of the Jews, whether in Israel or outside it.

For example, in 1937, although the situation of the Jews in Germany, and to a lesser extent in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe was quite bad, Zionism was increasing in strength in Palestine. The period from late 1940 to early 1942 is even more revealing in this regard. The great majority of continental Europe was under German occupation; German forces stood at the gates of Egypt, and were deep inside the U.S.S.R. However, the weakness and relative isolation of Great Britain and the unreliability of the Arab regimes and ruling classes at the time greatly increased the value of the Zionist alliance for the British. The time during which Weitz, with the blessing of the major Zionist leaders, planned his "transfer" of Palestinians beyond the Euphrates, is also the time of the great advance of Zionist armed strength (the development of the Haganah and the beginnings of the military industry), in alliance with and with the help of the British. The revival of the "transfer" idea immediately after the 1967 war is evidence of the same trend. This again contradicts an understanding of Zionism based on imperial or colonial models. After a great victory, an imperial state tends to consolidate its conquests, not begin to expel a population that can be exploited.

The analysis above has shown that neither "security" nor any other purported aims, even when they exist as part of the pragmatist tendency, are wholly subservient to the principle of "transfer" of as many Palestinians as possible. This holds even when Israeli security is in fact harmed by such a move. For example, the policy of trying to "transfer" as many Palestinians as possible from the Gaza Strip to Jordan continued until August 1968, well after the Battle of Karamah, when recruitment of fighters to the Palestinian resistance movement in Jordan was in full swing. It is only what are perceived as major power considerations, such as a war with a powerful Arab state, that have overridden the "transfer" idea. Such was the case with Ben-Gurion's willingness in 1956 to sacrifice the money to be devoted to "transferring" Palestinians to Libya in order to acquire more weapons to attack Egypt that same year.

The most important question to be asked in this context is: under what circumstances could a "transfer" of Palestinians, especially a total "transfer," take place? The evidence points to three possible sets of circumstances.

The first is the coming to power in Israel of the extremists, those who are not influenced by pragmatic considerations and who also believe that Zionism or Israel is always strong; or perhaps more accurately, who believe that Israel is both extremely strong and extremely weak at the same time. In their opinion, Israel is strong enough to do whatever it wants, including a total "transfer" immediately, if only the nation would unite and adhere to "true Jewish values." At the same time they believe that the same Israel (or the Jews) will be destroyed if a single Palestinian remains in Palestine; or if what they call "the western corruption of Judaism" continues. It is important to note that they attribute this same mixture of extreme strength and extreme weakness to the Palestinians in particular and the Arabs in general: they are perceived as being easily destroyed or expelled and at the same time, so strong that to allow even a few of them to remain would have disastrous effects. This is certainly reinforced by the Biblical threats of Divine punishment of the Children of Israel if they allowed any of the non-Jewish people to remain on the land.

These extremists, those to the right of the Likud, have the support of about 15 percent of Israeli society, but their influence is much greater than the numbers suggest. Their power is increased by the support (including financial) they receive from American Jewry, especially the orthodox. If these circles should come to power in Israel, the possibility of a total "transfer" becomes much greater.

The second possible set of circumstances that could lead to a "transfer" would be if a change were to occur in the nature of a significant part of the Israeli leadership, leading to a decline in pragmatism. As is well known in Israel, the original principles of LEHI (Stem Gang) as formulated by its founder Avraham Stem included (in addition to the alliance attempted with Hitler in 1940) a "transfer" of not only Palestinians, but also of Jordanians, Lebanese, and Syrians. Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir is a former member of LEHI who was promoted after Stem announced his plan of alliance with the Nazis. Although one should assume that his long years of political experience have taught Shamir ,the lessons of pragmatism, one cannot completely discount the possibility that his earlier beliefs might resurface. Shamir's recent association with a group of extremists who seek to rebuild the Temple, which was also an explicit part of LEHI's program, may point in that direction.

Finally, there is the possibility that the Israeli establishment as currently constituted may attempt a partial "transfer." It is a principle of the Israeli and Zionist establishment that a political alliance or at least working relations with an important outside power should be kept at all costs. (This is an additional difference between the pragmatists and the extremists.) This principle was clearly present in the debates in Zurich in 1937 and was explicitly mentioned by Weitz in his very first note about the total "transfer." Israel's current dependence upon the U.S. reduces the question to a simple one: under what conditions could the Israeli establishment carry out such a transfer without risking its relationship with (particularly its financial support from) the U.S.?

The question cannot be answered with certainty but one may venture that such a "transfer" would be possible under two sets of circumstances: either during a war initiated by Israel or in a situation in which American Middle East interests (the security of the oil fields or the stability of pro- American Arab regimes) are threatened. In such a situation Israel would emerge as the sole regional American ally of any strength. It is also true, however, that current regional conditions- the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq and the improvement in relations between the superpowers-would seem to render unlikely either of the two scenarios. On the other hand, there are internal Israeli factors, discussed at length in the Hebrew press, which favor an Israeli pre-emptive strike against Syria.

Nonetheless, there are two very important elements that have changed the situation for the better. The first is the emergence inside Israel, especially in 1974-75 in reaction to the 1973 war, of a sizeable minority of a character that will not remain silent in the face of a possible "transfer." The second is the development of a corresponding element internationally which would be prepared to oppose such a move if it were to be initiated. Within Israel, this minority takes the danger of the "transfer" very seriously and states quite openly that it is prepared to oppose a transfer, even if that should mean civil war. While such a minority cannot be expected to stop the horrors of a conquest, it can, nonetheless, break the silence and, perhaps, if a "transfer" is attempted, stop its implementation. In the present situation this is the most that can be hoped for inside Israel, and, in comparison with the past, it is certainly a significant step.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FORTY-ONE

1. Samuel Landman, Great Britain, the Jews and Palestine (London: New Zionist Press, 1936), p. 4.

2. Ronald Sanders, The High Walls of Jerusalem, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1983, p. 563.

3. Ibid., p. 566.

4. Ibid., p. 566.

5. Morris Jastrow, Zionism and the Future of Palestine (The Fallades and Dangers of Modern Zionism), New York: The Macmil- Ian company, 1919, p. 117.

6. Ibid., p. 117.

7. Ibid.,pp. 151-159.

8. The New York Times, March 5, 1919, p. 7.

9. Encyclopedia Judaica, Vol. , New York: The Macmillan Co., 1971, pp. 607-608.

10. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Arthur S. Link, Editor, Volume 55 (February 8 - March 16, 19 19), Princeton. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 438-439.

11. Encyclopaedia Judaica, Vol. 2, p. 679.

12. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Arthur S. Link, Editor, Volume 55 (February 8 - March 16, 1919), Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 438.

14. "Prominent Jews Protest Against Zionist Program; Congressman Kahn Presents Petition to Peace Conference Through President Wilson Opposing National Jewish Unit." The Jewish Review and Observer. March 14, 1919, Cleveland, Ohio, March 14, PP. 1,4.

15. A Survey of Palestine 1945-46, Volume 1 , Chapter I, p. 4.

16. Ibid., p. 1.

17. FO 371/24565 Foreign Office Documents, Public Record Office, London, p. 162.

18. British Command Paper No. 1700 printed in A Survey of Palestine 1945-46 Volume 1, Chapter 2, Annex I, pp. 87-90.

19. British Command Paper No. 5479.

20. British Command Paper No. 55 13 printed in A Survey of Palestine 1945-46 Volume 1 , Chapter 2, p.40.

21. British Command Paper No. 5854.

22. British Command Paper 5893 printed in A Survey of Palestine 1945-46 Volume I, Chapter 2, pp. 46-48.

23. British command Paper 6019 printed in A Survey of Palestine 1945-46, Volume I, Chapter 2, p. 94.

24. Political Survey 1946-1947, The Jewish Agency for Palestine, Jerusalem, July 1947, pp. 70-71

25. Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question, p. 124. 26. lbid.. p. 125.

27. lbid., p. 114.

28. lbid., p. 115.

29. David Ben-Gurion, Israel, A Personal History, Funk and Wagnalls Inc., New York, 197 1, pp. 80-8 1, and the Israel Year Book 1950-5 1.

30. Foreign Relations of the United States 1948, Vol. 5, Part 2, p. 989.

31. Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly. Part 1, First Committee 1948, p. 644.

32. Ibid., p. 645.

33. Ibid., p. 682.

34. Statistical Handbook of Jewish Palestine, 1947, published by the Department of Statistics of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, Jerusalem, p. 55, and Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983, No. 34, p. 71.

35. Statistical Handbook of Jewish Palestine, 1947, published by the Department of Statistics of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, Jerusalem, pp. 36-40.

36. A Survey of Palestine for the Information of the Anglo- American Committee of Inquiry, Vol. 2, p. 566.

37. Palestinian Government Staff List as of the 1st of April, 1947, published June 1947 by the Government Press, Jerusalem, pp. 1-55.

38. Supplement to the Survey of Palestine for the Information of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, June, 1947, p. 89.

39. A Survey of Palestine for the Information of the Anglo- American Committee of Inquiry, Vol. 2, pp. 946-950.

40. Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Selected and Prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1949), volume 2, pp. 94-95.

41. Security Council Official Records, 1380th Meeting on November 17, 1967 at 3p.m., page3, column2.

42. Ibid., p. 4, column 2.

43. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Intifada, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1990, p. 3 19.

44. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, 1948, p. 420.

45. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Volume V, part 2, p. 989.

46. Geraldine Brooks. "Loose Cannons: Israeli Arms Dealers Quite Openly Operate on the Fringe of the Law," The Wall Street Journal, May 9, 1990, P. 10.

47. Ha'ir, April 10, 1987, translated by Israel Shahak, cited in Jane Hunter, The Israeli Connection: Israeli Involvement in Paramilitary Training in Colombia. Washington, D.C.: Arab American Institute. 1989, P. 4.

48. Morris Jastrow, Zionism and the Future of Palestine, New York, Macmillan Co., 1919, P. 159.

49. Ellis, Marc H., Toward a Jewish Theology of Liberation, Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1990, pp. 104- 105.

50. Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel, New York: Herd Press/ McGraw Hill, 1971, vol. 2, p. 746.

51. Alexander Cockburn, "Israel's Democratic Image vs. the Harsh Truth," The Wall Street Journal, June 14, 1990, p. A15.

52. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Intifada, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990, pp. 95-96.

53. Israel Shahak, "A History of the Concept of 'Transfer' in Zionism," Journal of Palestine Studies, Volume 18, No. 3, Spring 1989, pp. 22-37.

54. David Ben-Gurion, ed., Darkhei Mediniuteinu [The Ways of Our Policy: A Full Report about the World Convention of Yehud Po'alei Zion, C.S.1, Tel Aviv: Federation of Po'alei Zion Publication, 1938.

55. Ibid., subsequent quotes in this section are taken from the same source.

56. From 1932 until just before his death Weitz kept a very detailed diary. The first five volumes were published in 1965, Tel Aviv: Massada, and described the period until 1964. The sixth volume, describing the years 1964 to 1970, was published in 1973.

57. Ya'akov Sharett, ed., Ezra Danin, an Autobiography, Tel Aviv, 1986.

58. Ibid.

59. Hebrew press of 18 July 1988.