http://www3.haaretz.co.il/eng/scripts/article.asp?mador=4&datee=6/17/01&id=121571
Just when we were about to give them so much
By Gideon Levy,
Ha'aretz 06/17/2001
So how did it happen that just when we were about to give the
Palestinians so much, the new Intifada broke out? How is it that
precisely after they received from Ehud Barak the most far-reaching
offer ever made by an Israeli prime minister they turned to violence?
The standard, and mistaken, Israeli answer is that the reason is
simple: The Palestinians don't want peace, or they are not ripe for
peace. By citing this reply, the Israelis make things easy for
themselves and absolve themselves of responsibility for what happened.
And the remnants of the left exempt themselves from their commitment.
The truth is that Israel bears not a little responsibility for the
eruption of the present cycle of violence, no less in fact than that
borne by the Palestinians. Israel did indeed make the "most generous
offer" to the Palestinians, but it was not enough to achieve a just
solution, and what preceded it was too much for the Palestinians too
swallow.
Reminder: For the three years of Benjamin Netanyahu's government,
Israel evaded implementing the majority of its commitments under the
1993 Declaration of Principles. There was no second redeployment, no
release of prisoners as agreed, no "safe passage" route, no
Palestinian airport or seaport, while on the other hand there were
more and more settlements. The spirit of Oslo ceased and was replaced
by an evil spirit of despair and disappointment on the Palestinian
side. From their point of view, there seemed to be no true partner for
peace.
Netanyahu's successor, in 1999, did not alleviate their situation.
Barak took pride in declaring that he did not give the Palestinians
even one centimeter of land, not even Abu Dis, adjacent to Jerusalem,
which even the Knesset agreed to forgo - a rather strange display of
pride for a peacemaker. Indeed, Barak began by embarking on the Syrian
track, and only after it proved to be blocked did he swerve onto the
other track and seek a permanent agreement with the Palestinians.
An expert in dismantling watches but inept as putting them back
together, Barak put forward proposals that most Israelis considered
daring, but which could not be acceptable to a Palestinian leader who
is going to sign a declaration of the end of the conflict and the end
of Palestinian claims. Are we talking about 96 percent of the
territory?
Salim Shawamreh, a driver from the village of Anabta, whose house was
demolished by Israel three times, probably described the
characteristics of the generous Israeli proposal better than any
statesman: In jail, too, 96 percent of the territory is in the hands
of the prisoners, Shawamreh said of the demolition of his home, and
the warders have only 4 percent, but it's there that the fences and
the watchtowers are located.
That was what the Israeli proposal resembled in Palestinian eyes - a
Palestinian state with tight Israeli control over the gateways: split
into small sections by blocs of settlements that would preclude a
normal way of life and free movement. And on top of that came the lack
of a serious Israeli effort to solve the refugee problem and an
unwillingness to recognize Israeli responsibility - albeit not
exclusive responsibility - for the refugees' fate.
After the Palestinians agreed to their major historic concession at
Oslo - recognition of the fact that most of the territory that was
once their country would remain in Israel's hands - one truly generous
and unavoidable offer was needed: the return of all the territories
occupied since 1967, perhaps in a territorial trade-off. Barak did
not make any such offer to the Palestinians. When he came to his
senses at Taba, a few days before the elections, it was already too
late. Afterward, Barak's foreign minister, Shlomo Ben-Ami, related
that the sides were very close to an agreement at Taba; and Yossi
Beilin reported tremendous progress even on the subject of the
refugees' right of return. But it was all far too late.
Not that the Palestinians didn't make mistakes. Their mistakes are
too many to bear, beginning with a lack of sensitivity for the issue
of personal security in Israel. And not that the Americans didn't
make mistakes. Ben-Ami says the president was not authoritative and
aggressive enough, particularly toward the Palestinians. At the same
time, underlying the negotiations were two basic Israeli approaches,
which remained totally unchanged in the 34 years of the occupation: a
concept of lordship and inequality with respect to the Palestinians,
and the assessment that we are in a zero-sum game, in which every gain
made by the Palestinians comes at Israel's expense.
In a comprehensive article, which will soon be published in the United
States, Dr. Ron Pundak, one of the architects of the Oslo process,
also reaches the conclusion that the major obstacles, even if not all
of them, that blocked an agreement derived from Israeli policy. His
article seeks to refute the thesis that the Oslo process collapsed and
failed; and at the same time it refutes the new position taken by the
Israeli left, namely that the right wing is correct in its conclusion
that Israel has no partner for peace. Pundak finds that there is a
Palestinian partner and that it is important to say so precisely now,
and that Israel only needs to be aware of the limits of the
Palestinians' maneuverability.
At the time Barak made his take-it-or-leave-it offer, the occupation
continued as usual. The closure went on, land was expropriated,
prisoners - heroes in the eyes of their people - remained incarcerated
in Israeli jail cells, settlements were expanded. During the 18 months
of the Barak government, the number of settlers increased by 12
percent. Barak also shied away, as from fire, from any unnecessary
contact with Yasser Arafat - yet another bizarre decision, which
weakened the Palestinian leader. The Palestinians' economic situation
deteriorated, their humiliation was intensified. This entire course of
events could only end in disaster, as it did.
