http://www3.haaretz.co.il/eng/scripts/article.asp?mador=4&datee=5/16/01&id=119486
Who is interested in escalation?
By Amira Hass
Ha'aretz 05/16/2001
A week ago last Tuesday, a "military source" met with correspondents
covering the territories and surveyed the situation on the West Bank
(the Judea-Samaria region, minus Jericho). Midway through the survey,
the "military source" said: "I am happy that there are no mortars or
anti-tank shells here. I would not like to see them here - on either
side. I am assuming that they [the Palestinians] do have them.".Some
of the correspondents asked for clarification of this statement and
the "military source" continued: "This assertion is backed up by solid
evidence. There are unquestionable facts that have come to the
surface. Granted, we have not actually seen these weapons; however, it
is very probable that there are mortars here."
The "military source" was again asked to be more specific: "Are you
saying that the mortars are there, but are simply not being used at
the moment?" And the reply given to the correspondents was: "I think
that they will use them somewhere down the road, depending on the way
they see the confrontation and depending on what their primary
interests are at the time."
The correspondents then heard the promise that the Israeli response to
mortar shelling would be "very tough" and would not just be a
"pinpoint counter-attack." It would not be a mere "mortar chase." And
what are the prospects that the Palestinians will use mortars? "From
the standpoint of statistical probability, each day that passes
increases the likelihood" was the answer.
No wonder that, immediately afterwards, newscasts opened with the
report that the Israel Defense Forces' assessment was that the
Palestinians would use the mortars in their possession on the West
Bank as well. This was the lead item on radio and television news
broadcasts all that day, and in the newspapers the following day. Here
was further evidence that the Palestinians were escalating the
conflict. Meanwhile the IDF was only preparing itself for an
appropriate response and for an effective way of ending that threat.
The groundwork was already laid: Last Saturday, IDF missiles killed
two Palestinians in Jenin. One of them was a traffic cop and the other
was a member of Fatah, who had been traveling in his car with some of
his friends. These people had been planning a mortar attack, IDF
sources said.
A few facts and figures that the "military source" conveyed in the
aforementioned meeting and the meaning of those facts and figures have
gotten lost on the way. For example: of the 2,900 "shooting incidents"
that took place between last September and the day of that meeting, 34
percent had been directed against civilians (on the West Bank), while
the rest were directed against soldiers; 115 roadside bombs had been
planted on the West Bank and 24 terrorist attacks and attempted
terrorist attacks against targets within Israel were launched from the
West Bank; of all the incidents on the West Bank, 12 percent were
"direct hits against targets" and 8 percent were "attacks on physical
targets, such as buildings and cars; in 4 percent of the incidents
there were casualties (injuries or deaths).
Apparently, so far the Palestinians have shown great respect for the
Green Line, although it is very easy to penetrate Israel from the West
Bank. Moreover, two thirds of the operations were directed against
military personnel. Of course, that fact is not legitimate in the eyes
of Israelis, because they do not believe that the imposition of
Israeli rule on the Palestinians justifies armed struggle. Obviously,
the fact that people were killed or injured in 4 percent of the
incidents is horrifying. Nonetheless, this fact does prove that the
Palestinians' capability is very limited. It would seem that the IDF
and Israel's political leaders are convinced that the only way to
ensure that the Palestinians' capacity for inflicting harm is kept
very limited is to kill more people and to produce greater damage on
the Palestinian side. Proof of this approach can be seen in the fact
that the IDF killed five Palestinian national security personnel on
Monday when those personnel were inside their permanent position in
Bitounia, just west of Ramallah.
Here are a few questions about the logic of that IDF operation (while
the immorality of the action raises many unvoiced questions):
* As is the case with all Palestinian national security personnel, the
casualties here were Gazans. Residents of the West Bank are not
desperate enough to join up for such a demanding job, which is both
thankless and poorly-paid. This fact is common knowledge to the IDF
top brass and the Shin Bet security service. As usual, the Gaza Strip
is taking most of the really hard punches from the IDF. Did anyone in
the IDF or the Shin Bet consider what impact the killing of five
Gazans in a single operation would have on the morale of the besieged
population of the Gaza Strip? Did anyone in the IDF or the Shin Bet
consider how the feelings of the members of that population would
influence the political decisions of the Palestinian leadership?
* More than 70 percent of all Gazans are refugees. Thus, it would
have been reasonable to assume that most of those who were stationed
at that position in Bitounia were refugees. Fate decreed that all five
killed in the operation were in fact refugees. Did the commander who
gave the order for this attack take into account the impact that the
killing ("murder" in Arabic) of the five would have on the Palestinian
security services in Gaza, most of whose personnel are refugees? How
will these personnel now relate to orders to closely monitor persons
planning terrorist attacks? or to orders not to participate in the
"popular resistance committees"?
* Palestinian national security personnel have not been involved in
any shooting incidents against Israeli targets. Quite the contrary,
the Shin Bet could easily inform the IDF and Israel's political
leaders that this agency is trying very hard to prevent armed persons
from approaching "points of friction" with the IDF. If their "reward"
for such actions is to be killed while sleeping in their beds, why
should they not decide to join those who are doing the shooting and at
least die in battle?
* The five Gazan refugees were killed at their post just one day
before Nakba Day. The IDF and the Shin Bet issued warnings of a
possible escalation of violence on Nakba Day; yet, by killing another
five refugees, they have increased the feelings of anger in the Gaza
Strip on the day of that area's great catastrophe. So far, the
Israeli response, which is 20 times more powerful than any Palestinian
attack, has not managed to paralyze the Palestinian armed struggle.
The only conclusion to be drawn is that Israel's responses must now be
100 or 200 times more powerful than the Palestinian attacks. That is
why IDF troops killed Ahmed Zaqout, Salah Abu Amra, Mohammed
al-Khalidi, Mohammed Abu Daoud, and Ahmed Abu Mustafa. This is not
escalation. This is a quantum leap forward. This is just a "preemptive
strike." Meanwhile, Israelis are standing to attention and maintaining
silence.
