Between hope and the abyss
By Abdel-Jawwad Saleh*
Al-Ahram Weekly, 5 - 11 August 1999
How can the Palestinians step back from the edge of
the abyss? Through grass-roots empowerment, writes
Abdel-Jawwad Saleh
Political activists, members of the Palestinian Legislative
Council (PLC), and prominent personalities (mostly independent)
in Palestinian political life are taking steps toward the
formation of an independent democratic movement. Another
initiative is being organised by former members of traditional
Palestinian groups, who are disenchanted by their leaders and
the way they are handling the problems facing the Palestinian
people. All these are united by a common imperative: in the
absence of a democratic mass movement which can allow the
Palestinian people to confront the socio-political challenges
facing it, the Palestinian cause will sink into the abyss.
The independent members of the PLC are supported by non-members
who played important roles in the Palestinian national movement
before Oslo. This mobilisation results from the perceived need
to rectify the mistakes made by the Palestinian Authority (PA).
Such political moves constitute a positive response, although it
may have come a little late in the day, to Mr Arafat's
indifference. The absence of good governance has had serious
ramifications on popular morale, the fabric of Palestinian
society, and the prevailing code of ethics. All these have been
gravely damaged.
The PA's failure to set up strong institutions covering the three
branches of its political system has jeopardised the Palestinian
dream. The PA's denial of the Basic Law (the Palestinian
Constitution), enacted by the PLC, is one of the main reasons for
both PA failures and popular frustration.
The Palestinians are unexpectedly reminded of occupation
policies: de-development, de-institutionalisation and a budget
reminiscent of that of the occupation. Average people, to express
their anger, have begun to compare the practices of the PA with
the arbitrary repression practiced by the Israeli occupation.
The Palestinian cabinet does not exist as an institution. Its
inability or refusal to prioritise concrete issues is well known.
Since its inception, it has avoided tackling problems like
unemployment, the phenomenal spread of poverty and the lack of a
participatory approach involving the people in national
development plans. The PA routinely denies funding to, and
suppresses the opinions of, grass-roots groups. Palestinian
children's health and the quality of their education are
declining at a precipitous rate. The absence of an independent
judiciary is undermining the potential for democratisation.
Eventually, the systematic weakening of the PLC will imperil
democracy.
The "collateral" activities of the security agencies, and the
creation of a one-party system on a semi-military basis, are
paving the way for the creation of a fully fledged police state.
The PA leadership's abuse of power, responsibilities, and human
rights has led to the widespread diffusion of corruption. The
majority of Palestinians believe that an Intifada is brewing. The
ingredients: frustration and despair. This situation has also
weakened the PA before its Israeli counterpart. The paralysis
that prevents the PA from confronting internal and external
shortcomings is one of the factors crippling it in negotiations.
The other main factors behind the independent Palestinian
initiatives are the stalemate of the peace process and the
unprecedented acceleration of Israeli colonisation. Arafat, our
main negotiator, has shown that he always bows to pressure. Barak
knows that very well, and will manipulate it to the maximum. In
fact, he has already started the game. First, Arafat cancelled
the Geneva Convention signatories' meeting. Second, he yielded to
Barak's request to establish a working group that will study
Barak's "suggested" changes to the Wye Memorandum. The changes
include the postponement of further redeployments stipulated by
Wye until the final status negotiations -- in other words,
decades from now.
We would do well to remember that Barak was the only minister
under Rabin who rejected the Oslo Accords, in line with
Netanyahu's position. This fact alone should arouse suspicion
with regard to his "requests". His negotiating conditions, or
"red lines" -- namely, maintaining Israeli control of the Jordan
Valley; no dismantling of the colonies; ensuring contiguous
Israeli "areas" (to dismember any potentially viable Palestinian
state); no "foreign" sovereignty over Jerusalem (he rejected the
raising of a Palestinian flag over the holy sites); and no return
of Palestinian refugees to their homes -- are equally eloquent.
In combination with Barak's new policy, which is to refrain from
implementing the Wye Memorandum of understanding, and instead to
postpone it until the final status negotiations, these goals
should give observers a clear idea of what he is up to.
What will the Palestinians be negotiating for, if the red lines
are imposed and further redeployments are transferred to the
final status negotiations? Nothing of substance, that is certain.
Barak will limit negotiations on the Palestinian track to
defining the nature and function of the future Palestinian
entity. This explains why he is committed to the implementation
of UN Resolutions 242 and 338 on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks,
but denies their applicability to the Palestinian track. Barak,
unfortunately, is trying to follow in Netanyahu's steps, and to
go a little further still. His intention is to give the
Palestinians a state devoid of substance, deprived of land and of
Jerusalem. He will let the Palestinians call their "entity" the
State of Palestine and borrow whatever adjectives the leadership
likes. The Palestinian leadership's weaknesses will allow the
Israelis to maximise their gains, while reducing the Palestinian
share to nothing -- to a state without Jerusalem, without
recognised international borders, without sovereignty over its
lands and water; a state with nothing but a meaningless name.
This is the ideal formula for continued conflict.
Barak's goal is to turn the PA into an Israeli security agency
responsible for suppressing the Palestinian people and for
protecting the settlers, the settlements and Israel. Who will
accept this?
How can the Palestinians respond? This is an exceptionally
difficult question. But a good place to start is with the
empowerment of the Palestinian people, which will allow them to
face the challenges ahead. Those who have taken recent
independent initiatives understand such empowerment to mean the
creation of a favourable environment: elections at all levels,
including local government; a parliament surpassing the Oslo
terms of reference; and presidential elections. The new
leadership will derive its sovereignty from the people. New terms
of reference will be adopted by a new team of negotiators --
terms based on the people's inalienable rights. This might be the
only option left, if the Palestinians are to save themselves.
*The writer is a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council.
