http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/1998/378/pal2.htm
Issue No: 378
Date: 21 - 27 May, 1998
AL-AHRAM
New history, old ideas
By Edward Said
The French monthly Le
Monde Diplomatique together
with the Revue d'etudes
palestiniennes, a quarterly
journal published in Paris by
the Institute of Palestine
Studies, held a conference last
week which I attended and
participated in. Although it
was announced as the first time
that the so-called "new"
Israeli historians and their
Palestinian counterparts had
exchanged ideas in public, it
was actually the third or
fourth time; yet what made the
Paris meeting so novel was that
this was certainly the first
time that a prolonged exchange
between them was possible.
On the Palestinian side there
were Elie Sambar, Nur Masalha
and myself; on the Israeli side
Benni Morris, Ilan Pappe,
Itamar Rabinowitch (who is not
really a new historian, but a
former Labour Party adviser,
Israeli ambassador to the
United States, professor of
history at Tel Aviv University,
and an expert on Syria, but
whose views seem to be
changing), and finally, Zeev
Sternhell, an Israeli historian
of right-wing European mass
movements, professor at the
Hebrew University, author of a
very important recent book on
the myths of Israeli society
(the main ones of which -- that
it is a liberal, socialist,
democratic state -- he
demolished completely in an
extraordinarily detailed
analysis of its illiberal,
quasi-fascist, and profoundly
anti-socialist character as
evidenced by the Labour Party
generally, and the Histadrut in
particular).
Because it was not
well-advertised, the conference
attracted rather small
audiences on the whole, but
because of the quality of the
material presented and the fact
that sessions went for several
hours, it was a very valuable
exercise, despite the
unevenness of some of the
contributions. One very
powerful impression I had was
that whereas the Israeli
participants -- who were by no
means of the same political
persuasion -- often spoke of
the need for detachment,
critical distance, and
reflective calm as important
for historical study, the
Palestinian side was much more
urgent, more severe and even
emotional in its insistence on
the need for new history. The
reason is of course that
Israel, and consequently most
Israelis, are the dominant
party in the conflict: they
hold all the territory, have
all the military power, and can
therefore take the time, and
have the luxury to sit back and
let the debate unfold calmly.
Only Ilan Pape, an avowed
socialist and anti-Zionist
historian at Haifa University,
was open in his espousal of the
Palestinian point of view, and,
in my opinion, provided the
most iconoclastic and brilliant
of the Israeli interventions.
For the others in varying
degree, Zionism was seen as a
necessity for Jews. I was
surprised, for instance, when
Sternhell during the final
session admitted that a grave
injustice was committed against
the Palestinians, and that the
essence of Zionism was that it
was a movement for conquest,
then went on to say that it was
a "necessary" conquest.
One
of the
most
remarkable
things
about
the
Israelis
again
except
for
Pappe,
is the
profound
contradition
borderin
on
schizophrenia
that
informs
their
work.
Benni Morris, for example, ten
years ago wrote the most
important Israeli work on the
birth of the Palestinian
refugee problem. Using Haganah
and Zionist archives he
established beyond any
reasonable doubt that there had
been a forced exodus of
Palestinians as a result of a
specific policy of "transfer"
which had been adopted and
approved by Ben-Gurion.
Morris's meticulous work showed
that in district after district
commanders had been ordered to
drive out Palestinians, burn
villages, systematically take
over their homes and property.
Yet strangely enough, by the
end of the book Morris seems
reluctant to draw the
inevitable conclusions from his
own evidence. Instead of saying
outright that the Palestinians
were, in fact, driven out he
says that they were partially
driven out by Zionist forces,
and partially "left" as a
result of war. It is as if he
was still enough of a Zionist
to believe the ideological
version --that Palestinians
left on their own without
Israeli eviction-- rather than
completely to accept his own
evidence, which is that Zionist
policy dictated Palestinian
exodus. Similarly, in his book
Sternhell admits that the
Zionists never considered the
Arabs as a problem because if
they did they would have openly
admitted that the Zionist plan
to establish a Jewish state
could not have been realised
without also getting rid of the
Palestinians. But he still
insisted during the conference
in Paris that although it was
morally wrong to expel
Palestinians, it was necessary
to do so.
Despite these discordances it
is impressive that when pushed
hard either by Pappe or by the
Palestinians, both Morris and
Sternhell appeared to hesitate.
I take their changing views as
symptomatic of a deeper change
taking place inside Israel. The
point here is that a
significant change in the main
lines of Zionist ideology
cannot really occur within the
hegemony of official politics,
either Labour or Likud, but
must take place outside that
particular context, that is,
where intellectuals are more
free to ponder and reflect upon
the unsettling realities of
present-day Israel. The problem
with other attempts by
intellectuals on both sides to
influence Netanyahu's policies,
for instance, is that as in the
case of the Copenhagen group
they take place too close to
governments who have a much
narrower, much shorter range
view of things. If the years
since l993 have shown anything
it is that no matter how
enlightened or liberal, the
official Zionist view of the
conflict with the Palestinians
(and this is as true of Left
Zionists like Meretz or centre
left people like Shimon Peres)
is prepared to live with the
schizophrenia I referred to
above. Yes, we want peace with
the Palestinians, but no, there
was nothing wrong with what we
had to do in 1948. As far as
real peace is concerned this
basic contradiction is quite
untenable, since it accepts the
notion that Palestinians in
their own land are secondary to
Jews. Moreover, it also accepts
the fundamental contradiction
between Zionism and democracy
(how can one have a democratic
Jewish state and, as is now the
case, one million non-Jews who
are not equal in rights, land
owning, or work to the Jews?).
The great virtue of the new
historians is that their work
at least pushes the
contradictions within Zionism
to limits otherwise not
apparent to most Israelis, and
even many Arabs.
It is certainly true that the
great political importance
today of the new Israeli
historians is that they have
confirmed what generations of
Palestinians, historians or
otherwise, have been saying
about what happened to us as a
people at the hands of Israel.
And of course they have done so
as Israelis who in some measure
speak for the conscience of
their people and society. But
here, speaking self-critically,
I feel that as Arabs generally,
and Palestinians in particular,
we must also begin to explore
our own histories, myths, and
patriarchal ideas of the
nation, something which, for
obvious reasons we have not so
far done. During the Paris
colloquium Palestinians,
including myself, were speaking
with a great sense of urgency
about the present since, in
this present, the Palestinian
nakba continues. Dispossession
goes on, and the denial of our
rights has taken new and more
punishing forms. Nevertheless,
as intellectuals and historians
we have a duty to look at our
history, the history of our
leaderships, and of our
institutions with a new
critical eye. Is there
something about those that can
perhaps explain the
difficulties as a people that
we now find ourselves in? What
about the conflict between the
great families or hamulas, the
fact that our leaders have
traditionally not been elected
democratically, and the fact,
equally disastrous, that we
seem to reproduce corruption
and mediocrity in each new
generation? These are serious,
and even crucial matters, and
they cannot either be left
unanswered or postponed
indefinitely under the guise of
national defence and national
unity. There is perhaps a start
of critical self-awareness in
Yezid Sayegh's new book on the
history of Palestinian armed
struggle, but we need more
concretely political and
critical works of that sort,
works whose grasp of all the
complexities and paradoxes of
our history are not shied away
from.
So far as I know neither the
work of Morris, Pappe, or
Sternhell has been translated
into Arabic. This absence
should be remedied forthwith.
Just as important, I think, is
the need for Arab intellectuals
to interact directly with these
historians by having them
invited for discussions in Arab
universities, cultural centres,
and public fora. Similarly I
believe it is our duty as
Palestinian and yes, even Arab
intellectuals to engage Israeli
academic and intellectual
audiences by lecturing at
Israeli centres, openly,
courageously, uncompromisingly.
What have years of refusing to
deal with Israel done for us?
Nothing at all, except to
weaken us and weaken our
perception of our opponent.
Politics since l948 is now at
an end, buried in the failures
of the Oslo process of
attempted separation between
Israeli Jews and Palestinians.
As part of the new politics I
have been speaking about in
these articles, a splendid
opportunity presents itself in
continued interaction with the
new Israeli historians who,
while a tiny minority
nevertheless represent a
phenomenon of considerable
importance. Their work, for
instance, had a great influence
on the 22 part film series,
Tekuma, shown on Israeli
television as a history of the
state produced for its 50th
year celebrations. They are
greatly in demand in Israeli
schools as lecturers, and their
work has attracted the
attention of historians and
others in both Europe and the
United States. It seems
anomalous, not to say
retrograde, that the one place
they have not been fully heard
is the Arab world, but we need
to rid ourselves of our racial
prejudices and ostrich-like
attitudes and make the effort
to change the situation. The
time has come.
"The Palestinian side was much more urgent, more severe and even
emotional in its insistence on the need for new history. The
reason is of course that Israel, and consequently most Israelis,
are the dominant party in the conflict: they hold all the territory,
have all the military power, and can therefore take the time, and
have the luxury to sit back and let the debate unfold calmly"
