Security Council Resolution 242 - Its Creation and Its Destruction

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Security Council Resolution 242
Its Creation and Its Destruction
By David Paul

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242
22 November 1967
The Security Council,
Expressing, its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member states in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict,
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Noam Chomsky commenting on 242:
"... Palestinian rights are mentioned only in the call for 'a just settlement of the refugee problem,' left unspecified. UN 242 is therefore thoroughly rejectionist in non racist terms: as denial of the right to self-determination of one or the other of the two contending parties in the former Palestine."
"The Israel-Arafat Agreement: A just and lasting peace or rejectionism?" Z Magazine, October 1993; p.19.

DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND
Positions after the war:
Arabs: All land occupied by Israel in the war must be returned.
Israel: They were willing to return most of the land seized but they wanted prior political concessions before returning any land. This was the position Israel had taken after the Suez War. President Eisenhower positioned the U.S. in opposition to such a concept:
"Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its own withdrawal?
If we agree that armed attack can properly achieve the purposes of the assailant, then I fear we will have turned back the clock of international order. we will, in effect, have countenanced the use of force as a means of settling international differences and through this gaining national advantages.
I do not, myself, see how this could be reconciled with the Charter of the United Nations. The basic pledge of all the members of the United Nations is that they will settle their international disputes by peaceful means, and will not use force against the territorial integrity of another state.
If the United Nations once admits that international disputes can be settled by using force, then we will have destroyed the very foundation of the Organization, and our best hope of establishing a world order. that would be a disaster for us all.
I would, I feel, be untrue to the standards of the high office to which you have chosen me, if I were to lend the influence of the United States to the proposition that a nation which invades another should be permitted to exact conditions for withdrawal."
Radio and relevision address to the American people on the situation in the Middle East, 20 February 1957.

LBJ WEAKENS US RESOLVE
The Johnson Administration rejecting Eisenhower's uncompro-missing stand on the principles of the UN Charter immediately conceded to Israel its demand that it should impose conditions on its withdrawal. This fatal mistake forced the Administration into expending most of its energies into creating a withdrawal formula acceptable to Israel.
This meant that withdrawal would not be total- not an unreasonable demand since the border was the arbitrary lines of the 1949 armistice, and the Arab nations agreed that some slight changes would benefit both sides. The fundamental assumption was that the changes made would be minor with reciprocal concessions. The American blunder here was their blindness to the idea that if withdrawal need not be total, then Israel could argue later (as it did) that its withdrawal did not have to be major.
At the beginning of the war Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eskol had written Johnson that Israel had no "colonial" aspirations and did not seek territorial aggrandizement- a line constantly repeated by Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban to the Americans.
On 19 Sept. Eban had laid out for U.S. Ambassador Goldberg Israel's ideas for a settlement: they would return the Sinai to Egypt but keep the Gaza Strip; they would make some territorial adjustments with Syria; in Jerusalem the arrangement would be for the Holy Muslim Quarter to be placed "under Moslem control and sovereignty;" and on the West Bank there would be a U.N. inspection system over a demilitarized West Bank and there would be "some form of economic, customs or travel arrangements which would permit access to and larger cooperation with the area." This was recognized by the State Department as a hardening of the Israeli position with aims beyond those supported by U.S. policy as pronounced by President Johnson in his speech of 19 September.
According to a secret State Department study conducted during Carter's term the U.S. began "seeking a draft Security Council resolution which employed indefinite language on the withdrawal question" based on assurances from Eban that Israel sought only "small security adjustments" in territory. The U.S. negotiators did not suspect that the use of indefinite language on withdrawal might eventually be employed to justify Israel's retention of all the West Bank, the Golan Heights and Jerusalem.
Rejecting the concept of an overall settlement with the Arab states the Israeli Cabinet met in August and in secret decided to try for a bilateral accord with Egypt- thus neutralizing their most powerful enemy and relieving pressure on Israel for an agreement on the West Bank. If he signed a peace treaty Nasser would get back the Sinai. Nasser rejected the offer realizing that a separate peace would leave Israel free to deal with the other Arab nations as it wished and that it would be in such a commanding position that it would probably not give up the West Bank.
King Hussein later noted, "Nasser told me that the Sinai was not important compared to the Palestinians. Though rejected by Nasser this deal was accepted by his successor Anwar Sadat when he signed the treaty at Camp David. This goes a long way in explaining the disdain Hussein displayed toward Sadat and the treaty.
King Hussein arrived in New York on 2 Nov. as spokesman for the Arabs offering recognition of Israel in return for captured territories, "total peace for total withdrawal" as he put it

CREATING 242
King Hussein, Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad and Ambassadors Eban and Goldberg were all staying at the Waldorf-Astoria Towers. A series of exhaustive secret meetings were held there with the U.S. working behind the scenes to forge an agreement acceptable to both the Arabs and Israel. Goldberg assured Hussein that regarding territory "there must be a mutuality in adjustments."
Two drafts incorporating the indefinite language on a withdrawal clause were presented to Eban:
• "withdrawal of all forces from territories occupied by Israel"
• "withdrawal of armed forces from occupied territory."
Naturally Eban preferred the vaguer of the two.
The State Department secret study states, "Having developed a phraseology on a withdrawal question acceptable to Israel, the U.S. officials then sought to sell the phraseology to the front-line Arab states. In so doing, the U.S. officials emphasized that any territorial adjustments would be limited in nature and would not, of necessity, be detrimental to the Arab states."
On 6 November in Washington Secretary of State Rusk repeated this to the King. Rusk on reporting to Johnson on this meeting explained, "that the net effect of these assurances was that the United States was prepared to support the return of a substantial part of the West Bank to Jordan with boundary adjustments, and would use its influence to obtain compensation to Jordan for any territory it was required to give up."
On 7 November India, Mali and Nigeria introduced a draft resolution. The U.S. countered by introducing on the same day a draft using the vague terms privately agreed on with Israel, "withdrawal of armed forces from occupied territory." The Arabs objected because there was no mention of Israel; there was no time attached to indicate what occupied territories; and the draft in declaring that there should be "freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area," completely ignored Egypt's claims.
On 8 November Hussein met with President Johnson who reaffirmed the U.S. commitment. during the discussion the King asked Johnson how soon he might expect an Israeli withdrawal. "In six months," was Johnson's reply according to Hussein. Later Goldberg was to give the same timing for withdrawal, Hussein asked Goldberg if the Israelis agreed and Goldberg assured him that they did.
On 11 November Goldberg reported to Eban the Hussein, having met with the Arab delegations, was "satisfied with the assurances given to him in Washington. The secret study adds, "Evidently, Eban was aware of the assurances given Hussein, as he did not question or comment on Goldberg's statement."
On 16 November Lord Caradon of Great Britain introduced the draft resolution that was to become 242. It retained the vague language Israel demanded by avoiding the use of the territories in the English version (though not in the texts of the U.N.'s other official languages- Chinese, French, Spanish and Russian). However, it added a phrase that already implied the missing the: "emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." The U.S. backed this draft and resisted all attempts to introduce more specific language into the withdrawal clause.
Jordan, armed with what it believed to be an ironclad assurance from the highest levels of the U.S. government accepted it and Egypt reluctantly went along.
A Russian draft introduced on 20 November returned to the clause specifically calling for Israel's withdrawal of all its forces to the lines prior to 5 June. after a two day recess the Russians, to the surprise of everyone, voted for the British draft making the vote unanimous.

ISRAEL'S OPPOSITION
Various Israeli officials at different times have offered several arguments in opposition to 242:
• that the "central and primary" concern of the resolution was not withdrawal but rather the need for a "just and lasting peace." How a "just and lasting peace could be attained amid a military occupation Eban never explained.
• that the principle of the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" was not relevant to Israel since the phrase appeared in the preambular paragraph or, alternately, because it applied only to wars of aggression. That Israel launched the 1967 war is to be forgotten.
• that the extent of Israel's withdrawal was vague and undetermined since the resolution allowed for "territorial revision." This line was carried to the point of asserting that withdrawal was not "applicable to all the territories involved." But Eban had been involved in the discussions creating 242 and indicated that Israel agreed with the U.S. interpretation of it.
• that some or all of the territories were not actually occupied because they belonged to Israel by right. This assertion was consistently applied to East Jerusalem from the beginning. The U.S. finally protested in a statement by Ambassador Yost before the Security Council on 1 July 1969 in which he defined Arab East Jerusalem as "occupied territory [similar] to other areas occupied by Israel."

THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S SECRET STUDY
• "Support for the concept of total withdrawal was widespread in the Security Council, and it was only through intensive American efforts that a resolution was adopted which employed indefinite language in the withdrawal clause. In the process of obtaining this result, the United States made clear to the Arab states and several other members of the Security Council that the United States envisioned only insubstantial revisions of the 1949 armistice lines. Israel did not protest this approach."
• "There was no covert conflict between the United States and Israel over the U.S. views on withdrawal, and in several respects the U.S. position coincided with that of Israel ... at no time during this period did Israel argue that it would withdraw only on selected fronts. to the contrary, in conversations with American officials Israelis consistently discussed the concepts of withdrawal and secure borders in terms of three fronts."

THE WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE
French version of a disputed paragraph:
i) Retrait des forces armees israeliennes des territoires occupes lors du recent conflit;

The Spanish wording:
"Retiro ... de los territorios"

Lord Caradon (author of 242):
"It was from occupied territories that the Resolution called for withdrawal. The test was which territories were occupied. That was a test not possibly subject to any doubt as a matter of fact East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan and Sinai were occupied in the 1967 conflict. I was on withdrawal from occupied territories that the Resolution insisted." (p.9)
"... it was the equal requirements of withdrawal and security on which the Resolution was founded and constructed. One depended on the other. Both were essential." (p.9)
"To destroy one side of the balanced whole would destroy the whole." (p.9)
"It is surely a matter of the gravest reproach to the principal world powers that, following on the rejection of Ambassador Jarring's efforts, no action was at once taken to give effect to the principles accepted by everyone in the 1967 Resolution. (p.10)
"The principal of "inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war" is clear. That requires a "withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories occupied in the recent conflict." And the Resolution went on to stipulate that withdrawal should be "to secure and recognized boundaries." (p.10)
"The attempted annexation of East Jerusalem, repeatedly and unanimously condemned in the United Nations, and the policy of creeping colonization on the West Bank and in Gaza and the Golan have threatened any prospect of settlement and peace." (p.10)
"These actions of the Israeli Government are in clear defiance of the Resolution 242." (p.11)
"I do not retract the phrase I used long ago about the Israeli settlements in Arab land. They are indeed "signposts of destruction." (p.11)
In: Caradon, [Lord] Hugh, et al. U.N. Security Council Resolution 242: A Case Study in Diplomatic Ambiguity. Washington, D.C., Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1981.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk:
"There has been much bickering over whether that resolution (242) should say from "the" territories or from "all" territories. In the French version, which is equally authentic, it says withdrawal de territory, with de meaning "the." We wanted that to be left a little vague and subject to future negotiation because we thought the Israeli border along the West Bank could be "rationalized"; certain anomalies could easily be straightened out with some exchanges of territory, making a more sensible border for all parties. But we never contemplated any significant grant of territory to Israel as a result of the June 1967 war."
Rusk, Dean (Secretary of State at that time). As I Saw It. W.W. Norton & Co.: New York, 1990. p.389 & p.390.

"I don't believe peace is possible until Israel agrees to withdraw from all territories seized in the June 1967 war."
"Resolution 242 never contemplated the movement of any significant territories to Israel."
Neff: "The Clinton Administration and UN Resolution 242," in Journal of Palestine Studies, Winter 1994, p. 26.

"It was clear to me at the time that Resolution 242 was somewhat flexible with regard to territories ... The purpose of this flexibility was to permit minor adjustments in the western frontier of the West Bank, for demilitarization measures in the Sinai and the Golan Heights and for a fresh look at the future of the city of Jerusalem. Resolution 242 never contemplated the movement of any significant territories to Israel."
Letter dated 23 Aug. 1983 to Donald Neff. Quoted in his Warriors for Jerusalem., p. 405 (n. 335).

King Hussein of Jordan:
"Since 1967, questions have been raised as to the true meaning of 242 ... I asked for clarification of the withdrawal provision at the time and was told the United States was prepared to make a commitment that would be understood to require Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory of the West Bank, with 'minor reciprocal border rectifications' conditional on mutual agreement ... An essential part of the understanding as conveyed by the representatives of the United States was that Israel had acquiesced in the agreed interpretation of what Resolution 242 would require. The specific term used was that Israel was 'on board.' And furthermore, that six months would be the outside limit for its implementation."
Speech before the World Affairs Council in Los Angles on 6 Nov. 1981.
Quoted in Neff: Warriors for Jerusalem. p. 349.

William Rogers (Nixon's first Secretary of State):
In a speech on 9 December 1969 noted that 242 "calls for withdrawal from occupied territories, the non-acquisition of territory by war, and recognized boundaries. We believe that while recognized political boundaries must be established, and agreed upon by the parties, any changes in the preexisting lines should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security. We do not support expansionism."

Henry Kissinger (Nixon's second Secretary of State):
"Jordan's acquiescence in Resolution 242 had been obtained in 1967 by the promise of our United Nations Ambassador Arthur Goldberg that under its terms we would work for the return of the West Bank to Jordan with minor boundary rectifications and that we were prepared to use our influence to obtain a role for Jordan in Jerusalem."
Kissinger, White House Years, p. 345.

CARTER'S MONUMENTAL BLUNDER
"He (Israeli PM Begin) also extracted from the President (U.S. President Carter) a promise that the President would not talk publicly anymore about Israeli withdrawals to the 1967 borders with minor modifications, and that he would refrain from using the formula "a Palestinian homeland." In return, the President asked Begin to exercise greater restraint on the question of settlements, but obtained no commitment from the Prime Minister. When the President put forward the argument that security through territorial annexation would in fact be a formula for insecurity, Begin responded by saying that there would never be foreign sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza."
Z. Brzezinski. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981. Farrar, Straus, Giroux: New York, 1983. p.100
"The President noted the following on a memorandum that Brzezinski had prepared for him before the meeting:
On point 4, [Begin] thinks UN 242/338 adherence is adequate prior to Geneva- asks that we not use phrase "minor adjustments" without prior notice to him- I agreed."
"After this meeting with Begin the President had no reason to doubt the Israeli leader's determination to keep control over the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem."
Quandt, William B. Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics. The Brookings Institute: Washington, D.C., 1986. pp. 81 & 82. [Quandt had served on the National Security Council where he was responsible for dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict.]

AFTERMATH TO THE BLUNDER
Presidents Bush and Reagan are both on record as stating the U.S. stands behind 242. Both have asserted that withdrawal must come on "all three fronts" and that peace must come in exchange for land. But as to their belief that withdrawal should include only minor adjustments the statement is that U.S. policy remains the same.

CLINTON ABANDONS 242
During the peace talks on 30 June 1993, before the September 1993 accord between Israel and the PLO, the Clinton administration submitted a draft paper on an Israeli-Palestinian declaration of principles. In this draft the administration indicated that it had abandoned any commitment to honor the United States' original concept of 242. This draft stated: "The two sides concur that the agreement reached between them on permanent status will constitute the implementation of Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their aspects." Though legalistically ambiguous it would seem to indicate that the US now has no position at all on the meaning of 242.

OSLO II AND THE END OF 242
The idea behind 242 was 'Land for Peace'
Oslo II seems to mean 'No Peace for No Land'
Oslo II creates 3 Zones:
• Zone A- The Palestinian Authority (PA) has full control. This zone is the municipal areas of towns populated exclusively by Palestinians.
• Zone B- The region of "autonomy" where the PA administers Palestinian villages under overall Israeli "security control." Zone B is a collection of scattered sections, about 100 of them according to Israeli maps.
• Zone C- Under total Israeli control. Zone C includes all Jewish settlements.
• A fourth Zone is Jerusalem which is assigned to Israeli control including Arab East Jerusalem and areas beyond.
Land Area:
Zone A= 1-3%
Zone B= 30%
Zone C=70%
30% of Gaza will be held by Israel
[Sources differ on exact figures but not much from those quoted here.]
In 1988 Yitzhak Rabin called for Israeli controll of 40% of the West Bank and Gaza. Oslo II doubles it!
Oslo II (the agreement signed in November 1995) requires that the Palestinian Council elected in January 1996 must recognize the "legal rights of Israelis related to Government and Absentee land located in areas under the territorial jurisdiction of the Council."
As Professor Chomsky notes (Z Magizine, January 1996, p.38): "In effect, the PA (Palestine National Authority) therefore accepts the legality of already existing Jewish settlements and any further ones that Israel may choose to construct, and recognizes Israeli sovereignty over parts of the West Bank that Israel decides to designate as state and absentee lands (unilaterally, as in the past): up to 90% of Area B, according to "well-informed Palestinian sources" cited in the Report on Israeli Settlement, an estimate only, because the ruling authorities do not release information.
By incorporating these provisions, Oslo II rescinds the position of virtually the entire world that the settlements are illegal and that Israel has no claim to the territories acquired by force in 1967. Oslo II reaffirms the basic principle of Oslo I: UN resolution 242 of November 1967, the basic framework of Middle East diplomacy, is dead and buried.

David Paul is a documents librarian at Harvard College.