Canada and Israel, the oldest of friends
How Canada helped create Israel
Support for the Jewish state didn’t start with Harper
Editors’ note: This is part one in a two-part series, focusing on Canada’s role in creating and supporting Israel. Part two can be found here.
Canada, most citizens would proudly tell you, is radically different from its hawkish and interventionist southern neighbour. It is often said that Canada opts for neutrality on the world stage. And when it does intervene, it does so under the auspices of UN peacekeeping missions, clad in the blue helmets embedded so deeply in the national psyche.
Those who maintain this line are worried that Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s policies toward Israel are betraying these long-held and admirable Canadian ideals. They argue that Canada should return to the policies of a golden age when the country used to have a balanced approach to global conflicts.
But are Canada’s present pro-Israel policies really that different from those in years past? As Ali Dessouki argues in Canadian Foreign Policy and the Palestine Problem and Yves Engler writes in Canada and Israel: Building Apartheid, the answer is no.
Canada’s foreign policy has consistently supported Zionism, defended Israel, and suppressed Arab nationalism.Harper’s stance on Israel and Palestine today is in fact broadly consistent with the country’s approach to the question from the very beginning. Looking at the role Canada played in the three most defining moments of Arab and Israeli relations — the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 and the June 1967 war — it becomes clear that Canada’s foreign policy has consistently supported Zionism, defended Israel, and suppressed Arab nationalism.
The birth of Israel and Canada’s role
When the UN decided to partition the British mandate of Palestine and award the majority of land to those seeking to create a Jewish state in 1948, a process of dispossession and displacement of the indigenous Arabs of Palestine began. Canada played an active, and even decisive, role.
When a special committee was formed at the UN to deal with the Palestine question, Canada sent a delegation headed by Lester B. Pearson, Undersecretary of State for External Affairs at the time and future prime minister. Pearson was elected chairman of the committee, and under his leadership the UN Special Committee on Palestine was established in 1947.
Canada's representative at the UNSCOP, Supreme Court Justice Ivan C. Rand, would go on to become a hero of the Zionist movement. In 1954 the Winnipeg Jewish community planted a forest in Rand’s name in Israel, as thanks for the role he played in the establishment of that country. In 1968 the Hebrew University of Jerusalem created the Ivan C. Rand Chair of Law. The Palestinians, meanwhile, offered no such honours.
The Palestinians, meanwhile, offered no such honours.Rand was one of the main architects of the UN partition plan, a fact noted by Dessouki, who quotes the Canadian Jewish Reference Book and Directory: “Judge Rand’s understanding and judgment influenced the commission to recommend the final solution to a problem that troubled the world – the establishment of a separate Jewish state in Palestine.” Not only did he criticize and intervene against the idea of a Jewish–Arab unity state at the UN, but he also, as noted by his biographer, “worked hard to ensure the maximum geographical area possible for the new Jewish state.”
Civilizational superiority as foreign policy
Rand’s support for Israel appeared to stem from his belief in the civilizational superiority of the West and from his religious convictions. Engler quotes Israeli historian Ilan Pappé in stating that Rand was “inclined to see it [creation of Israel] as a struggle between the forces of progress and democracy on the one hand and backward societies on the other.” In a foreword to Rev. William L. Hull’s book The Fall and Rise of Israel, which appeared years after the country’s creation, Rand wrote, “We believe that true Zionism is a move of God and that those who are true Zionists with a love of land God has given them will feel the urge to aid actively in Israel the rebuilding of Zion.” Of the Palestinian refugees that resulted from carrying out the will of God, he said, “The refugees expelled are in Arab lands, and the Word of God says that they shall not return to their cities.”
Rand was “inclined to see it [creation of Israel] as a struggle between the forces of progress and democracy on the one hand and backward societies on the other.”When the Arab states protested against the partition plan and demanded that the International Court of Justice be asked for its opinion on whether the UN had the jurisdiction “to forcibly execute” such a resolution, Canada voted no. Canada’s opposition was significant, as only a single vote prevented this issue from being taken to the court.
UNSCOP passed on its recommendation to the special committee, where Pearson was the chairman. Pearson was awarded the title “Lord Balfour of Canada” by Canadian Zionists just days before the final vote on the partition took place. Rabbi Pearson, as he was also called, worked tirelessly to ensure the implementation of the partition plan. Due to his mediation, the US and the USSR were able to resolve their differences over the fate of Palestine and agree on the idea of partition. A front-page article in the New York Times noted that the agreement between the Americans and Soviets was “a result of the tireless efforts of Lester B. Pearson.” The final accord between the two rival superpowers, which Maurice Western described as the “turning point of the Palestine debate,” was dubbed the Canada plan by observers. For his services, Pearson was awarded Israel’s Medal of Valor and the Theodor Herzl award from the Zionist Organization of America for his “commitment to Jewish freedom and Israel.”
Like Rand’s, Pearson’s support for Israel was rooted in Christian Zionism, which is also a major component of Harper’s support base. In his memoirs, Pearson referred to Israel as the “land of my Sunday School lessons,” where he was taught that “Jews belonged in Palestine.”
Canada and Israel, the oldest of friends
Canada's role in the Suez Canal Crisis
Far from keeping the peace, Pearson’s mission was war by other means
Editors’ note: This is part two in a series focusing on Canada’s role in creating and supporting Israel.
The Suez Canal Crisis is often touted as a turning point in Canadian history, the moment when the country came of age and displayed its true colours on the global stage. Canadian soldiers, from that point onward, became synonymous with UN peacekeeping missions in foreign lands, and Lester Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to mitigate the conflict.
However, a closer look at Canadian policies shows that the country’s image as a peacemaker is undeserved. In fact, Canada was an important player in the war against Arab nationalism.
Canada’s opposition to the 1956 French and British attack on Egypt in response to Egyptian president Gamal Nasser’s nationalization of the canal was not motivated by Canadian support for the newly decolonized world. Canada was on the side of the “great men of Europe,” as Pearson called them, when it came to denying an emerging Third World country such as Egypt its right of nationalization. Pearson, as quoted in Ali Dessouki’s Canadian Foreign Policy and the Palestine Problem, was clear: “I do not for one minute criticize the motives of the governments of the United Kingdom and France. . . . I do not criticize their purposes.”
Ready, aye, ready
What Canada disagreed with were the methods its mother countries had chosen to thwart Egypt. Dessouki writes that what France and Britain “failed to achieve by military force,” Pearson “was trying to get by United Nations’ resolutions.” Canada’s insistence that Western allies resort to the UN in order to deal with Third World nationalism was motivated primarily by a pro-American shift in Canadian foreign policy, but also by a desire to protect Israel.
After the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt began, the United States, the new imperial power, unhappy at seeing the two waning colonial powers interfere in an important strategic area without US approval, introduced a resolution at the UN calling for an immediate ceasefire and prompt withdrawal of forces from the area. Canada abstained from voting and, instead, introduced its own resolution. The difference between the US and Canadian resolutions was that the latter called for a UN peacekeeping force that would supervise the ceasefire.
Canada’s aim was to maintain the West’s grip over the Arabs –– under the tutelage of the AmericansPearson had wanted to place a UN force at the canal. According to Dessouki, Pearson explained to US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that the UN force would “make it possible for them [France and Britain] to withdraw with as little loss of face as possible, and bring them back into alignment with the US.” But bringing them into alignment with the US did not mean relinquishing control of the Middle East. On the contrary, Canada’s aim was to maintain the West’s grip over the Arabs –– under the tutelage of the Americans. What Canada had tried to convey to the Europeans was that going against the will of the United States would bring only embarrassment and that it was preferable to play junior partners to the US.
Different means, same ends
Canada’s goal was to counter secular Third World nationalism and protect Zionism, which was another reason Pearson had insisted on a UN force. Canada was attempting to exert control over Egypt by using the UN as leverage. This is why the international troops were stationed on the Egyptian side of the armistice line only. Even though Israel was the aggressor, no troops were sent to the Israeli territories. Pearson also proposed to transfer the administration of the Gaza Strip away from Egypt and into the hands of the UN, for which Canada came under fierce attack by Syrian and Jordanian representatives, who accused Canada of trying to take away whatever power Arab states had over the issue of Palestine.
When the withdrawal of all the troops was about to take place and UN forces were ready to step in, Canada insisted, contrary to the US, that Israel should be allowed to impose explicit conditions for its withdrawal. Canada succeeded in its demands. Israel withdrew, securing its right to passage through the Strait of Tiran, for which it had initiated the war against Egypt alongside France and Britain. Dessouki remarks that “Mr. Pearson successfully attempted to give this victory a political sanction by a resolution of the UN General Assembly.”
It is also important to note that Canada was one step ahead of the US when it came to defending Israeli interests against its Arab neighbours. The US was not in favour of a UN mission, and the Americans did not think that Israel, as the aggressor, had any right to impose preconditions for the withdrawal of its forces from the Egyptian territory. As Noam Chomsky has noted, the special relationship between the US and Israel began only after Israel’s stunning victory over the Arab states in the 1967 war. Canada, on the other hand, seemed to have entered into its own special relationship with Israel long before the Americans.
Cherry picking international law
Canada’s approach was plainly selective and at times hypocritical, because the goal of internationalizing the issue was to further disenfranchise already weak countries. In many cases international law was in favour of the weaker countries, and Third World countries showed solidarity with each other.
This was the case when Egypt denied Israel access to the Suez Canal. Canada ignored the provisions of the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, which stated that the “maritime Suez Canal . . . is an integral part of Egypt,” as well as ignored the fact that the Suez Canal Company, which oversaw control of the canal, was established under Egyptian law and was thus an Egyptian company, despite certain international obligations. The obligation Egypt had toward the international community was to allow right of passage through the canal “even to the ships of belligerents.” Canada used this particular provision to argue that Egypt was violating international law by preventing Israeli ships from using the canal.
However, what Canada conveniently ignored was that Israel was not a party to the Convention of Constantinople under which the canal was governed, as it was signed in 1888 when the state of Israel did not exist. In 1926 and in 1929, the International Court of Justice — the same court that Canada blocked from addressing the issue of partition of Palestine in 1948 — had ruled that “a treaty creates rights only for the states party to it.” In legal terms, Israel was a third state, and the right of passage to third states was a concept under domestic law but not international law. Therefore, to quote Dessouki, “Israel [could not] have this right against the will of Egypt.”
The limits of UN
The selective approach of Canada on internationalizing an issue by taking it to the UN was consistent with its goals of privileging Western and Israeli interests in the region. While it insisted on taking the Suez Canal Crisis to the UN, it conveniently refused to involve the International Court of Justice on the question of Palestine in 1948 as well as ignored the court’s provisions regarding Egypt’s rights over the canal.
Today, Canada regularly chastises the UN General Assembly for taking up the issue of Palestinian statehood and is the most vocal critic of the internationalization of the Palestinian issue. This is because the balance of power at the UN is no longer in Canada’s favour.
Those who demand that Canada should refer to the UN as it did, for example, over the Suez Canal Crisis, forget that the UN serves as a tool for the more powerful countries, championed when useful and disregarded when not.
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