Strategic Aims of the "Grapes of Wrath" Operation
By Israel Shahak
Even when facing atrocities and massacres like those caused by
Israel's "Grapes of Wrath" operation in April 1996, we should not
allow ourselves to lose sight of the strategy for whose sake the
atrocities and massacres are committed in the first place. Also,
some Israeli acts committed at the beginning of "Grapes of Wrath,"
and condoned by the United States and other states, are in their
long-range significance even worse that the massacres of Qufr Qana
and Nabatiya.
I refer, first of all, to the total naval blockade imposed by Israel
on all Lebanese ports, condoned by the United States. It is not by
chance that exactly the same kind of naval blockade was imposed by
Israel only two months before Lebanon on the Gaza Strip, over which
Israel claims and exercises sovereignty. It is quite obvious, even
from this single fact, that the first and most important Israeli aim
to be established in the "Grapes of Wrath" is to establish its
sovereignty over Lebanon--to be exercised in a comparable manner to
its control over the Gaza Strip. Orders, enforced by shelling and
bombing, given by Israel to the Lebanese population, to evacuate
cities and villages or move on the Lebanese roads only in one
direction are--in addition to their cruelty--also an exercise of
sovereignty, comparable to Israeli orders given to Palestinians
within areas supposedly ruled by the Palestinian Authority, to use
one road but not another one.
Another and even more important indication of the real Israeli aims
in regard to Lebanon is "the solution," often proposed by outgoing
Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres with regard to the "security
zone." He offers an Israeli withdrawal from it (after some months of
quiet), but only on the condition that the "South Lebanese army will
be integrated in the Lebanese army." I ask:, "What state dares to
dictate to another sovereign state what would be the composition of
its army, and this not covertly, as is perhaps done by the United
States in the case of Central American states, but openly?"
A similar condition was indeed imposed on the armies kept by the
Indian princes in British India, but it was a sign of the British
sovereignty. Now a similar condition is imposed in the case of "policemen"
of the Palestinian Authority, each group of whom arriving from
abroad needs Israel's approval to enter the area "ruled" by the PA.
In short, the first and more important Israeli aim is to reduce
Lebanon formally to the condition of the Palestinian Authority by
abolishing its sovereignty.
The demand, frequently made by Israel, that an outside force, such
as Syria, will disband or perhaps only demilitarize Hizbullah is
part of the same concept. As rightly pointed out by Graham Usher (Middle
East International, 29 March 1996) "the main task of the
Palestinian police ... during the intifada closure was to keep an
eye on the simmering population." This is exactly the role of such
external forces in any "solution" acceptable to Israel. For the same
reason, it is necessary from the Israeli point of view, as was noted
by Jacques Neriya, an important former advisor to the former Israeli
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (Davar, Friday Supplement, 19
April 1996), that the Syrian alliance with Lebanon be shown as
ineffective to defend either the Lebanese people or Lebanese
territory. This aim, as he duly noted, was achieved, and it was to
show the Syrian lack of effectiveness that Israel has attacked
places very close to Syrian positions without encountering any
reaction. The military forces which are to control Lebanon on
Israel's behalf are, if the "Grapes of Wrath" be terminated
successfully from the Israeli point of view, to be as subservient to
Israel as the Palestinian police is. This will be then only a step
toward establishing Israeli hegemony over the Middle East. Peres may
have changed right-wing Likud politician Ariel Sharon's style but
not his 1982 aims.
But, in addition to this primary aim, the "Grapes of Wrath"
operation is part of a wider Israeli plan of enveloping and
threatening Syria until it agrees to the Israeli (and American)
demands. This is, in my view, the second strategic Israeli aim. In
order to see it clearly we must consider current Israeli relations
with Turkey. As pointed out by the Hebrew and Turkish press at the
beginning of April and after some time confirmed by Turkish
authorities, the Israeli Air Force has been permitted to train in
all areas of Turkey. Alex Fishman, the knowledgeable military
correspondent of Yediot Ahronot (5 April), referred in this
context to the "Israeli Air Force's desire to fly in Syria's
backyard," but mentioned specifically the Turkish airbase at Adana
as useful for this purpose. It is also important to note that,
according to Fishman, "Adana is for all intents an American airbase
located on Turkish territory. This means that training of the
Israeli Air Force in it had received US prior approval." He
concludes that "the most important feature of this is that the
Turkish airbases in which the Israeli Air Force will now train are
situated, for all purposes, in Syria's backyard. They will serve as
a powerful deterrent against Syria." The relations between Turkey
and Syria are anyhow very tense for many reasons, which I will not
rehearse here, except to say that it is clear that Israeli Air Force
activities in Lebanon and Turkey are a part of the same strategic
pattern.
The third Israeli strategic aim is economic. As noted by Neriya (ibid.)
"the Lebanese economy, now thriving, is becoming a competitor of
Israel." In this connection it can be readily understood why the two
electricity power plants in Beirut that Israel had damaged are in
the Christian part of the city, although as Neriya (ibid.)
notes, there are electricity power plants also in the neighborhoods
inhabited by Hizbullah supporters and that, as the Hebrew press
commentators reported, the order to hit the first of those plants
came from Peres himself. The reason, in my view, is that the present
Israeli strategic aims are much wider than fighting Hizbullah. Many
rich Lebanese who began to bring back their money to Lebanon and
invest it there are Christians, while the Shiites are a poor
community. Thus, the Israeli economic interest, as interpreted by
Peres, the inventor of the "New Middle East" slogan, demands that
the Christian Lebanese investors be frightened and their investments
damaged by the loss of electricity. Presumably, some at least among
them will take their money out of Lebanon again.
The fourth Israeli strategic aim is to increase the efficiency of
the Israeli army and its self-confidence by the assault on Lebanon,
which is treated as a valuable exercise under "real" but not
dangerous conditions. As is know to those who pay attention to
Israeli financial and military affairs, its security budget grows
significantly when the Israel government talks about peace. As noted
by Meir Stieglitz (Yediot Ahronot, 18 January 1996) "the
first doubt [about peace] sprouts when it becomes clear that Peres
the Defense Minister is not aware of the views of Peres the Prime
Minister. The [Israeli] defense establishment got this year as large
a budget as if it was preparing for a big war and not for a
comprehensive peace." Although Stieglitz suggests, ironically, that
the reason why Israel does not cut its huge army budget is that a "short
circuit exists in the communication between the Prime Minister and
the Defense Minister," I am of the opinion that the real reason is
simpler: Israel indeed prepares for what in its habitual army jargon
is called "the next war."
In support of this view it is sufficient to make an effort and read
what the army officers have said to correspondents of the Hebrew
press during "Grapes of Wrath." Alex Fishman reports (Yediot
Ahronot, April 19) that the Israeli Air Force "acquires
experience whose value cannot be compared to gold." For this reason,
the Air Force went through the trouble to assure that as many of its
pilots as possible would benefit from the valuable experience the
"Grapes of Wrath" provides. A table was prepared (called, by the way,
"Table of justice") according to which every pilot gets an equal
opportunity to bomb Lebanon. The experience, so the Air Force
experts told Fishman, is especially valuable for young pilots who
have never yet participated in a war and who naturally fear their
first real military mission. The experience of bombing Lebanon is
liberating a whole generation of young pilots from this fear. The
men who deal with "more complicated operations" are also acquiring
more experience.
The same is true, according to other correspondents, with regard to
the Artillery, which has proudly invented a new slogan: "A Golani or
Paratrooper may fight, but it is the Artillery that shoots now!" Two
Davar correspondents, On Levi and Guy Leshem (19 April),
report on their visit to a "Colonel Ruby" who sits on a hill in
Lebanon and supervises the shelling of the villages around him. They
report that he feels like "Zeus on Olympus while throwing his
lightning bolts around." His soldiers also reported their
satisfaction: they can exhibit "their professional capabilities."
Many similar accounts have been published and there can be no doubt
that the general content prevailing in the army is, among other
factors, influencing the Jewish Israeli public to support the
"Grapes of Wrath." Since it was widely reported that the Israeli
army high command had pressured Peres to begin the war in the first
place (although in my view he wanted it as much as they did), the
only too visible feeling of satisfaction on the part of the Israeli
officers should be added to the more important wish of the army to
acquire experience for "the next war."
To conclude: the "Grapes of Wrath" operation must be seen as an
inseparable part of Israeli regional strategic aims. If those aims
do not undergo a radical change, which in turn depends on a basic
ideological change among Jewish Israelis, it can be assumed that
even if a cease fire will be patched now, a similar and perhaps a
worse operation will follow soon.
Israel Shahak is an Israeli peace activist and writer.
