“…that [Dostoevsky] should not have come up with even
a single word in the defense or justification of a people persecuted over
several thousands of years – could he have been so blind? – or was he perhaps
blinded by hatred? – and he did not even refer to the Jews as a people,
but as a tribe as though they were a group of natives from the Polynesian
Islands or somewhere – and to this tribe I belonged and the many friends
and acquaintances of mine with whom I had discussed the subtlest problems
of Russian literature…and the many other Jewish literary critics who have
gained what amounts to a monopoly in the study of Dostoyevsky.” Leonid
Tsypkin, Summer in Baden-Baden, 1982, trans. Roger and Angela Keys (London,
1987), 116.
There could be no more appropriate place to begin a discussion of the Jews
than with a reference to Russian novelist Fedor Dostoevsky and his attitude
toward the Jews. Dostoevsky in his writings displayed little admiration
for the Jews. In referring to the Jews, he employed the Russian word zhid,
which in modern Russian is interpreted as an ethnic slur (although in other
Slavic languages it is the sole word for Jew). Dostoevsky’s novel The Brothers
Karamazov contains a reference to alleged murder by Jews of Christian children
and ritual use of their blood, called blood libel by the Jews.
The topic at hand is Jews and the dramatic growth of Jewish power and influence
in America in the twentieth century. The Jewish influence and its perception
by non-Jews will have dramatic significance in coming years. I must confess
that I find Jews a troubling topic, in part because previously I have observed
that some individual Jews feel there is something “not right” in my own
feelings towards Jews. With assurance I know that, as I write these words,
what I say here will be dismissed and rejected by many Jews who read this.
I can regret that, but I cannot prevent it. The best I can offer is to follow
my own conscience in approaching the topic of the Jews. Tsypkin asks, not
entirely rhetorically, if Dostoevsky was blinded by hatred towards the Jews.
Periodically, I pause to consider my own reactions to Jews and their actions,
to consider if I am not blinded by some type of irrationality. Such reflection
leads always to the same three conclusions: (1) There is something greater
and more substantial to the Jews and their history than any human can discern.
(2) One cannot discard the notion that the Jews represent the ultimate test
for Christians, and Christians, therefore, must act with deference and caution
in their dealings with Jews. (3) While Christians are obligated to respect
the Jews, one, nevertheless, has an obligation at all times to seek objective
truths. In viewing the inevitable conflicts that arise between Jews and
non-Jews, one must always attempt to discern the truth. It is in the definition
of that truth, and also in my emphasis that the search for truth is the
task of both non-Jews and Jews, that many Jews find fault with my attitude.
What does it mean for someone to suggest that Dostoevsky, a writer and thinker
of considerable moral insight, the world’s greatest novelist for some readers,
was blind to truth? Was not the ascertainment of truths one of the tasks
of Dostoevsky’s life as a writer and as a human being? Taking Tsypkin’s
question above at face value and considering also his general respect for
Dostoevsky’s literary work, I would rework his question in this manner:
Did it happen somehow that Dostoevsky was guided in his life by some irrational
hatred of the Jews, all the while he otherwise pursued in other matters
of life a rational search for truth? Such a proposition is itself irrational.
How could it be that Dostoevsky demonstrated such insight in all realms
of life except that relating to the Jews? And what of Dostoevsky’s obligation
to “come up with even a single word in the defense or justification of a
people persecuted…”? Was Dostoevsky, who wrote bluntly of his characters
and their moral imperfections, morally obligated to alter or to falsify
his own artistic vision in defense of the Jews?
As a believing Christian, I approach the topic of the Jews with trepidation,
conscious that Christ, His Mother and the first disciples came out of the
milieu of ethno-religious Judaism. He who despises the Jews must surely
despise some aspect of Christ, the first Christians, and Christianity. Russian
writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn views the Jews, at times critically, as a
catalyst for all humanity. I am inclined to agree with such an interpretation.
If we study the history of Jews and Christians, we see that, indeed, the
Jews often present the ideal historical moment for the Christian to practice
his faith. Often, however, Christians have failed this test. Russian philosopher
Vladimir Solov’ev wrote in 1884: “The Jews have always treated us in accordance
with the Jewish faith, though we, the Christians, have yet to learn to treat
the Jews in the Christian fashion.” Evreistvo i christianskii vopros (Moscow
1884, 3).
Many-faceted are the contradictions of Jewishness, so much so that one hardly
knows where to begin a conversation on the topic. I am interested in the
meaning of Jewish history. Studying the natural processes of assimilation
in which ethnic groups have been formed and then eventually, with the passage
of time, subsumed within other ethnic groups more recently arisen, one comes
to the realization that the Jews have managed to continue as an ethnic group
many centuries longer than any other ethnic group.
The Jews themselves disagree on the meaning of their history. There are
different interpretations of the meaning of Jewish death and suffering during
the Second World War, for example. Some religious Jews view the Jewish tragedies
of that period as divine chastisement. Some non-religious Jews see those
events as a mark of Jewish singularity, yet they refuse – strangely, in
the view of the religious believer – to acknowledge a religious basis for
that singularity. Whatever the meaning, it seems certain to me that a divine
hand intervenes in the midst of every Jewish generation. It is inconceivable
to deny that the Jews occupy a special place in history.
One wonders about individual Nazis, otherwise in some cases exemplary fathers,
husbands and local citizens, who faced the moral dilemma of whether or not
they could themselves torture or murder another human being because he was
a Jew. One recalls the biblical tale of Isaac and Jacob and Isaac’s unwavering
obedience to God. Many Christians were thus tested and failed, though perhaps
under entirely different circumstances, one such individual might have lived
out what would have been considered a normal, decent life. In such a case,
was it the Jew or the human shortcomings of the Nazi that precipitated the
latter’s damnation? Perhaps the sincere Christian should heed the frequent
criticism that comes from the Jews and should view, accordingly, the Jews
as an eternal witness, an eternal reminder of the moral failings of humanity.
Yet in searching for the truth of the Jewish question, we must consider
the moral obligation of the Jew towards the non-Jew. Discussion of the conflict
between Jews and non-Jews very often revolves around Jewish criticism of
the specific actions or expressions of a non-Jew. That criticism typically
is a response to what is labeled “anti-Semitism,” a term that in my mind
has little intellectual validity. Despite its prefix, “anti-Semitism” is
a concept without any opposite. Some have suggested that the unhyphenated
“antisemitism” is the more correct form, since “anti-Semitism” implies mistakenly
that it exists in opposition to “Semitism.” There is no logic in any definition
of “anti-Semitism.” The term itself is a piece of propaganda.
To speak of “anti-Semitism” is to insinuate that only one side in this dispute
has morality, objectivity, “decency,” and truth. In such a one-sided debate,
all the prerogatives of truth and morality belong to the side opposed to
“anti-Semitism.” In my own experience, I have seen the label “anti-Semite”
applied to anyone who criticizes Jews, even when that person is honest and
acts with the most sincere motives. In academe and the media, those who
are branded “anti-Semites” are blackballed and refused employment. Use of
such language in its own right is a political act, and I propose that “anti-Semitism”
and its derivatives be avoided by all of those who seek an objective discussion
of Jewish issues.
Discourse on the Jewish question typically revolves around an act or expression
of “anti-Semitism,” to which voices of “morality” and “decency” respond.
Yet in introducing the quote from Tsypkin above, I choose to begin my discussion
by letting the Jewish side make the first move, so to speak. For a discussion
of the Jewish question cannot be limited solely to Jewish responses to the
non-Jew, but must also consider the Jew’s role and responsibility in that
discourse. The Jewish question consists of much more than simple immoral
behavior by individual non-Jews.
What is the root of the modern conflict between Jews and non-Jews? I am
not a Jew and I cannot know the feelings and intuitions of Jews, though
with curiosity often I have observed these first-hand. My interpretation
of the Jewish view of the conflict is as follows. Jews, even the majority
that does not practice the Jewish religion, tend to view this conflict in
moral terms. The positions taken by the non-Jewish side in the conflict
are, in Jewish eyes, typically viewed as immoral, irrational. The criticism
of Dostoevsky above is often leveled at all non-Jews: non-Jews fail, in
various ways, in their obligations towards the Jews. A Christian must agree
that such a criticism is sometimes valid, though all sides should also come
to terms with the fact that there is a hierarchy of moral issues for Christians
and that there are sincere, devout Christians who will not define the practice
of their religion primarily by fulfillment of a Christian obligation towards
Jews, which varies according to the time and circumstances.
I detect another Jewish sensibility in the Jewish reaction towards non-Jews.
Some Jews oppose very firmly any reference by non-Jews to stereotypical
Jewish behavior and attitudes. At times, I am left with the impression that
Jews are less interested in reaching the objective truths of the Jewish
question than they are in insuring the well being of their own community,
even if that involves obfuscation of the truth. As I interpret the actions
and expressions of Jews, it seems to me that the Jews believe their historical
role as the Chosen People absolves them from any obligation of self-criticism.
The solidarity of the Jewish community in working towards common goals is
remarkable, and it is unrivalled in any other ethnic community in history.
Observing the behavior of the Jews I have known, I believe almost every
situation in the Jew’s life is met with the question “Is it good for the
Jews?”
What is the reaction of the non-Jew towards the Jew? There is one very common
stance that characterizes much of the historical interaction between the
Jew and the non-Jew. This involves a base envy, one of the ugliest of human
sins. Envy results from the contrast, visible in every field and every endeavor,
between the material successes and rewards of the Jew, on the one hand,
and the personal inadequacies of individual Jews, on the other. Such a contrast
riles the sense of order and fairness in some non-Jews, especially in those
of a baser, simpler nature.
Over the centuries Jews have taken pains to emphasize what they believe
is the religious nature of anti-Jewish feeling among Christians, though
anti-Jewish expressions actually precede Christianity. Of course, it has
been advantageous for Jews to emphasize religious prejudice among their
critics, rather than to focus on political, cultural, or economic factors.
This is one of the causes of the widespread and deep Jewish hatred for the
Catholic Church. As a believing Christian, I do not see religious prejudice
on the part of Christians as a significant element of the Jewish question.
I take offense at what I interpret as a distortion of history by those Jews
who blame Christianity for the moral failings of individuals whom Jews sometimes
incorrectly associate with Christianity.
If we acknowledge some genuine moral failings in envious individual non-Jews,
and if the Jew can accept my belief that the essence of the Jewish question
is not religious prejudice on the part of Christians, are there still, then,
other aspects of the historical conflict that deserve our attention? I believe
there are. Dostoevsky is not a poor example to follow in interacting with
the Jews. In his writings Dostoevsky always pursued what he believed to
be truth. There can be no higher goal for any person. While I know that
the Jews are at times a controversial topic, one that history demonstrates
can transform an otherwise decent human being into a monster, I seek always
to be honest in my own feelings and perceptions that relate to Jews.
It would be dishonest for me to deny that my own impressions of the individual
Jews I have known in my life are predominately negative. Such a statement
for some Jews, unfortunately, disqualifies me, in their eyes, as an objective
voice in this discussion. Yet my desire to come to the truth of the Jewish
question is stronger than any feeling of moral obligation that I “…come
up with even a single word in the defense or justification of a people persecuted.”
I am troubled by any moral obligation that would demand an obfuscation of
the truth. Unfortunately, I have observed that some Jews feel they have
an obligation to silence all criticism directed at Jews as individuals and
as a group. What kind of world will we create when Dostoevsky is not to
be allowed to follow his conscience and describe bluntly life as he sees
it?
My contacts with ethnic Jews date to fourth grade, to Nanette, a quiet bespectacled
girl whose name and face I still recall. Since adulthood I worked closely
with Jews in business and in academe. Only a small fraction of the Jews
I have known practiced Judaism. Most were Jews in a complex ethno-cultural-political
sense. These non-religious Jews constantly redefined their Jewishness according
to the situation of the moment. Of the Jews I have known personally, I respected
most the elderly professor who was a member of my dissertation committee,
a devout practitioner of the Jewish religion. (Perhaps it is worth mentioning,
in regard to the makeup of contemporary American universities, that of the
five members of my dissertation committee, one was the aforementioned religious
Jew and two were non-practicing Jews. A fourth was a member of an officially
recognized minority whose wife, also a professor, was Jewish).
For non-Jews, the Jews are puzzling in so many respects. No other nation
on earth exhibits such ethnocentrism. With their vast supplies of energy
and intelligence, Jews as a group are like a show of fireworks, unstoppable,
inevitably burning themselves out to the last spark and flame. As I learned
in academe, criticism of Jews in America and other parts of the Western
world today is frowned upon, if not effectively prohibited. Unless one can
speak with some accuracy about Jewishness, it is foolish to raise the subject
at all, since the Jews are formidable opponents of all in whom they see
even a hint of determined opposition to them. Never in my life have I encountered
such resistance and such emotional hostility as when I have voiced a criticism
of the Jews.
I shall relate a personal anecdote which allows me to introduce the controversial
topic of stereotypes and also concerns general questions of truth. I have
observed that some non-religious Jews are reluctant to reveal their ethnicity
to non-Jews, no doubt a relic of memories of oppression passed down from
generation to generation. In order to conceal their ethnicity, some Jews
are willing to concoct elaborate subterfuges. It offends me and insults
my intelligence when a person whom I know very well to be Jewish indicates
or suggests that he is not. One such an experience took place during a foreign
study program in Moscow, when my Jewish roommate made an effort to convince
me that he celebrated Christmas. At that time I was a doctoral student and
my younger roommate was an undergraduate. It really was of no significance
to me what holidays, if any, the student celebrated. I was preoccupied then
with my own research, and I found his repeated references to his celebration
of Christmas distracting. By chance, I later overhead his conversation with
his Jewish colleague in which he expressed considerable bitterness towards
Christianity, Christians, and their holidays. (More than half of the students
participating in that program were Jewish). I was genuinely puzzled by his
behavior. What bizarre sense of alienation led him to seek my approval,
all the while he despised values that he associated with me? I was repulsed
by his dishonesty.
Is it proper to repeat such an anecdote? After all, I have implied that
the actions of one individual somehow represent a behavioral pattern of
millions of individuals of like ethnicity. We cannot talk about Jews without
some reference to the historical Jewish stereotypes that are both despised
and denied by Jews. Americans have been educated since the 1960s to believe
there is no truth in the traditional ethnic stereotypes. But this is ludicrous.
In the stereotypes that apply to my own ethnic background, I recognize some
awkward human truths, but I cannot deny that these truths apply broadly
to a wide population that shares a common ethnicity and cultural heritage.
In speaking about Jewish stereotypes, I acknowledge that there are always
exceptions to the rule, some of them remarkable. Yet I have found that my
own generalizations formed over years of personal contact with Jews are
valid for a great majority of Jewish individuals.
The notion rules today in America that is improper and impolite to criticize
Jews. This idea has been promoted by the social engineers who, since the
1960s, have argued that historical truth should be subordinated to efforts
to attain ethnic and racial harmony in America. In the twenty-first century
“nice” people do not criticize Jews, just as they do not attribute to them
any characteristics of the ethnic or racial stereotype. A powerful tool
used in the advancement of this idea is film and television. Not only is
it almost impossible to find a Jewish character in American film or television
that exhibits a negative characteristic, but the “evil of anti-Semitism”
was a periodic theme in American films in the twentieth century. One recalls
the criticism of Dostoevsky above, that he might have attempted a little
social engineering in his novels on behalf of oppressed Jews. This phenomenon,
in fact, has been observed for many years in the American entertainment
industry and news media. Again, the moral question clashes with the intellectual.
Is it more proper to speak honestly about Jews, or to work for their welfare
and well-being, as a penance for the past and insurance against any possible
future lapses into immorality? My major criticisms of Jews as a collective
relate to the question of an objective, verifiable truth. I am troubled
that Jews appear willing to distort the truth in the pursuit of what they
believe to be noble purposes and that Jews attempt to silence criticism
of their own group.
A common criticism of the Jews as a collective is that they promote social
turmoil. Like each of the issues in this conflict, there are two sides to
be argued. With their dynamic intelligence and abilities, Jews as a group
naturally become leaders in any new political and cultural movement. This
is clearly a phenomenon based on individual talents, not the workings of
a conspiracy. Yet is it proper to ask that the Jews pause to consider the
reaction their involvement in these movements produces upon non-Jews? Does
the Jew have any moral obligation towards the non-Jew? As Polish poet Czeslaw
Milosz has described himself, I consider myself an anti-modernist, opposed
to the ugliness and dehumanization of modernity. And we must admit that
modernity has a Jewish face, whether it is Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, Bob
Dylan, Howard Stern, or the Jewish stars of the galaxy of American pop culture.
There is another troubling issue raised in the Tsypkin quote above. Tsypkin
refers to himself and to “…the many other Jewish literary critics who have
gained what amounts to a monopoly in the study of Dostoyevsky.” Based on
Tsypkin’s own reservations towards Dostoevsky, one is justified to ask if
the non-Jewish public can expect true scholarship and objective analysis
from a community of scholars that, according to Tsypkin, is almost exclusively
Jewish. My interest in this question is not entirely unbiased, since I was
denied academic employment in a field that not only is dominated in America
by Jews, but that also increasingly defines itself in terms of Jewish topics
and Jewish perspectives. The issue of Jewish bias in academe and in the
news media is an essential part of the Jewish question in America, something
that relates to its moral equation.
In graduate school I was impressed with the skills of Jewish students who,
given a writing assignment, quickly visited the library, consulted or checked
out all the best reference works on the subject, distilled the information
from those sources, and produced a paper. Typically, the Jewish student
is capable of assimilating and convincingly disseminating a great deal of
information within a short period of time. Part of the success of those
Jewish graduate students was in their familiarity with existing resources.
But I found also that much of what my Jewish colleagues produced in graduate
school was, in my truthful opinion, quite shallow and lacking in originality.
In their efficiency and display of energy, something substantial nearly
always was sacrificed. Again, I reference a stereotype, one often proven
true in my experiences over the years.
Jews exhibit a constant push for a competitive edge. I do not completely
understand that Jewish drive. Perhaps it comes from ancestral fear of ethnic
persecution, or perhaps it has its roots in the Jewish ethnocentrism. Throughout
history, it has produced tensions between the Jews and their host societies.
From one perspective, all can understand the Jewish mother who pushes her
son to become a lawyer or doctor. On the other hand, we must recognize that
it is pathological to use such an achievement as a measurement against which
all Jewish sons are to be judged. Can one ask, in good faith, if the Nazi
movement might have been stopped had there been fewer Jewish lawyers and
professionals in interwar Germany? For the Jews, such a question is preposterous.
Thus, one concludes that the true root of the Jewish problem is in Jewish
ethnocentrism and in the Jewish identity masquerade, in which the Jew becomes
so emotionally involved that he is blind to the non-Jewish reaction to his
ethnocentrism.
To return to my observations on the preponderance of Jewish scholars in
my own academic field, I must admit that I find something suffocating and
inbred in the networks that develop among Jewish scholars. The Jewish presence
in academe leads to a tendency for professors and department heads to count
sympathy towards the Jews and Jewish interests as a significant criterion
for selecting new employees. It is unthinkable today that any university
would hire a professor who refused to profess sympathy towards the Jews.
In the end, Jews are unable to prevent the disastrous effects of their own
ethnocentrism, which inevitably produces conflicts with non-Jews. Yet as
I understand the Jewish perspective, Jews believe that non-Jews have a moral
obligation not to interfere in any way in the affairs of Jews, even when
Jewish behavior produces what non-Jews interpret as negative influences
in their own community. Considering the immense power and influence wielded
in America by Jews, Jewish and non-Jewish Americans must determine how to
balance these two obligations: the moral obligation of the Christian towards
the Jew, and the intellectual obligation to seek the truth in all matters,
even if that truth is unflattering towards the Jew.
I must confess, finally, to a conviction that surely will bring down upon
my person Jewish wrath. This matter does not directly concern the Jewish
question as a contemporary issue, although it relates to Dostoevsky and
the question of historical truth. I question something that, for the Jews,
is considered to be beyond questioning, beyond the realm of discussion by
rational people, that is, blood libel. I find it hard to believe that there
is no truth in any of the accusations of child murder leveled against Jews
over the centuries. Jews refer to these crimes, which have been written
about for over two thousand years, as blood libel, implying that as a blatant
libel, there could never be any consideration of the truth of such claims.
One persuasive argument against the truth of the accusations is that religious
prescriptions prohibit the ritual use of blood by Jews.
My suspicions about the validity of at least some of the charges arise,
in part, from the absolute refusal of Jews to consider the truth of any
of those charges and also from the Jewish label of blood libel. It is a
topic on which a remarkable solidarity prevails among Jews. Yet it is puzzling
that the charge occurred so many times over the centuries and throughout
such a wide geographical territory. While the Jews ridicule conspiracy advocates
who blame them for elaborate plans of Jewish political and economic domination,
one must consider if the accusations of child murder against the Jews would
not represent an even vaster and more complicated conspiracy. To categorically
reject all such accusations is to accept an anti-Jewish conspiracy more
sinister than even the wildest paranoia of the most determined enemies of
the Jews. Of course, if one believes that anti-Jewish feeling is a historical,
almost naturally motivated force in the world, then perhaps it does not
seem surprising that similar charges against the Jews have been documented
so often and in so many places.
Yet, as one generally inclined to reject conspiracy theories, I find it
hard to believe that anti-Jewish Christians over the centuries could have
displayed such organization and consistency in repeatedly laying such serious
similar charges against innocent individual Jews. The issue is complicated
by the fact that, in some of the more recent cases, the individual Jews
charged with blood libel were, in all probability, innocent of the crimes
that were committed. Yet the pattern of the accusations over the centuries
arouses my suspicion, as does the Jews’ unwillingness to consider any of
the evidence. An innocent party, to my mind, would confront the charges.
Thus, speaking as a student of history, I am inclined to believe that the
circumstances of the crimes and their frequency suggest that at least some
individual Jews practiced a type of cultic ritual that required the murder
of Christian children. To make this statement is, in the world we live in
today, the equivalent of saying “I am an idiot, incapable of reason. I believe
in aliens, the physical return of Elvis, the flatness of planet earth.”
Yet foolish as it is to acknowledge this publicly, in light of the assured
response, I must state what I believe. My belief in the validity of at least
some of the charges of blood libel comes not from an inherent antagonism
towards the Jews, but from my understanding of the historical evidence.
In the final analysis, I am left, still, with the same convictions: (1)
The history of the Jews and the successes of individual Jews are the product
of divine providence. (2) The Jews often represent a moral test for the
non-Jew. In noting the contrast between the rewards granted the Jews and
the personal shortcomings of individual Jews, the Christian must always
act morally. (3) While the Christian is obligated to show some deference
to the Jews, this does not mean that he may obfuscate the truth. Dostoevsky
was not obligated by any moral or social responsibility to alter his artistic
vision of the Jews. As a student of history, I believe that the behavior
of Jews, particularly their disregard for objective, historical truth, will
result in disastrous consequences for America. For all their horror of Nazism
and the suffering of Jews during the Second World War, there has not come
from the Jews any proposal of how that tragedy might have been averted,
of what steps Jews themselves might have taken to change the course of history.
One suspects that there are Jews who would never prefer, in the final analysis,
that history in the 1930s and 1940s had taken any different course. One
senses Jewish conviction, and even satisfaction, in the inevitability of
Jewish suffering and in the inevitability of an immoral response on the
part of the non-Jew. The Christian, however, cannot accept any such conviction
that ignores the teachings of Christianity and that suggests the Christian
faith cannot overcome the deepest of hatreds. For the non-Jew, Jewish suffering
can never be the central experience of human history, no matter how hard
some Jews work towards such an interpretation of history. In good faith,
I put the following question to Jews, especially to religious Jews, since
I suspect that I, as a believing Christian, share something in common with
them. Does the historical role of the Jews absolve them of any moral obligation
to attempt to understand the non-Jew’s reaction to the Jew? Or do the Jew
and the non-Jew inhabit two different universes, the Jew put on earth as
the non-Jew’s ultimate moral test, to follow always blindly his own conscience
and tradition, free of any responsibility in his relation to the non-Jew?
And is the non-Jew always to face alone the constant moral dilemma of how
to react to the Jew and to his strident ethnocentrism? Should any formulation
of moral duties and obligations lead to an end to these ancient antagonisms,
surely rational people on both sides of the dispute would embrace such an
idea. Yet so long as Jews believe that historical truths relating to their
relations with non-Jews have little importance, there is scant chance of
averting future conflicts.
Stojgniev O'Donnell is the pseudonym of an American scholar.
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